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LIBYA, ETHIOPIA, PDRY PACT SEEN AS REACTION TO GCC

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic No 226 31 Aug 6 Sep 81 pp 18-19

[Article by Nuhad al-Mashnuq: "The Aden Summit Meeting Is for Those Excluded by the GCC"]

[Excerpt] The Soviets Are Assembling Their Cards in the Red Sea Area.

A Summit Meeting for the Steadfastness Countries in Libya, Even If Algeria Does Not Come.

Arab diplomatic sources say that President Anwar al-Sadat's visit to Washington publicly assumed the nature of discussions concerning the Middle East crisis and the Palestinian autonomy talks, but that the visit was actually mostly for the purpose of discussing the Libyan situation and how to work toward achieving the downfall of Col Qadhafi, the Libyan head of state.

Faced with this situation, what could Col Qadhafi do? 'Ali Nasir Muhammad, head of state of South Yemen, did not wait for [improvement in] the atmosphere [among the Arab countries] before starting to work on the holding of the Aden summit meeting. He clearly began to prepare for it a long time ago. He did not do this on the basis of Soviet advice or approval from the Soviet leaders, but rather on the basis of a request made by the chief Soviet leaders during the Soviet Communist Party's 26th Congress which was attended by the South Yemeni head of state. This is what Eastern-bloc diplomatic sources in Beirut say. Since the formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC], which includes six Gulf nations and excludes the two Yemens and Iraq, 'Ali Nasir Muhammad has been working on the creation of a new political and geographical equation. He signed a mutual friendship treaty with Ethiopia last February and has sought out his comrades in the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front in order to discuss his plan with them.

Alliance of the Excluded

The reactions to the plan were not negative, although the Steadfastness nations, with the exception of Libya, were not invited to this meeting. The subject of discussion was the Red Sea area, although the GCC nations found, in their unity, support for them and their policy toward the Western nations. What is wrong with such nations, which have been excluded on the basis of their friendship with the Soviet Union, forming a political bloc which both strengthens and supports them?

Aden worked on the preparation of a draft agreement for political, economic, and military cooperation between the three countries. The most important thing in the political part of the draft agreement is that it emphasizes the rejection by these countries of the presence of American military bases in the Horn of Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, and North Africa, demonstrates that these three nations are against the reactionary political, military and security alliances in Africa and the Arab world, and intensifies these countries' alliance with the progressive and socialist countries of the world.

In the economic realm, the draft agreement calls for mutual material aid among the three countries so that they can carry out their plans having to do with development. Naturally Libya has already begun to immediately grant aid to the other two countries.

As for the military and security realm, the agreement calls for cooperation in all respects against the activities of imperialist, Zionist, and reactionary circles.

There is no doubt that the most important part of this agreement between these three countries was not made public. However, a glance at the map shows that they constitute a triangle, the sides of which surround the coastlines of Saudi Arabia, North Yemen, the Sudan, Egypt, and Somalia.

Ethiopia's Role

This does not mean that the nations which are located within the sides of this triangle--especially Saudi Arabia--are being endangered by this alliance. However, the exploitation of weak spots is something which is legitimate in the field of political action. Those associated with the summit meeting believe that the Sudan, North Yemen, and Somalia are weak spots which can be exploited if others contemplate action against one of the nations which took part in the summit meeting.

Eastern-bloc diplomatic circles in Beirut say that one of the results of the Aden summit meeting has been a commitment by Mengistu, the Ethiopian head of state, to move militarily against the Sudan if the Sudan tries to undertake any action against Libya. Thus the leader of Libya has made part of his border secure after relations between Ethiopia and the Sudan had been undergoing a positive development due to the Sudan's role in the Eritrean question. If it had not been for 'Ali Nasir Muhammad's efforts, this positive development in [Ethiopian-Sudanese] relations would have had a negative effect on Ethiopian-Libyan relations. This is why they say that the Aden summit meeting has achieved a strategic polarization with regard to the Red Sea area, and what is needed is to transfer this example to other areas in the Arab world.

Leftist Palestinian sources assure us that, in principle, the summit meeting of the Steadfastness and Confrontation states will be held in Libya after the 1 September celebrations which all will be attending, even though the Algerian president, Chadli Bendjedid, might not come.

ARAB STEEL PRODUCTION CAPABILITIES EXAMINED

London 8 DAYS in English No 43, 31 Oct 81 pp 44-45

[Text] AS MORE and more Arab states accord priority to building up indigenous iron and steel industries to lessen their dependence on imports necessary to industrial development, the Algiers-based Arab Iron and Steel Metallurgical Institute (IASM) is playing an increasingly important role.

It has already established an iron, steel and metallurgical documentation centre and is setting up an iron and steel data bank for the Arab world. The final stage of its plan is to open a technical and economic studies department capable of providing Arab states with the latest technical data and market analyses.

'We were surprised to learn that information on the metal industry in the Arab world simply did not circulate from one country to another, so that economic planners in Algeria, for instance, were practically in the dark about the plans of their colleagues in Saudi Arabia,' Djaffar Salah, IASM's director, told 8 Days.

The importance to Arab countries of developing their iron and steel industries was underlined at a conference in Doha in spring, sponsored by the Gulf Organisation for Industrial Consultation (GOIC). It reviewed progress over the past two decades, laid plans for growth during the 1980s and laid down the principles of a common strategy for broadening inter-state cooperation.

Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain and Qatar took part in the conference. All seven have made substantial progress in developing their capacity for producing iron and steel, but are still falling short of the region's rapidly climbing demand. Their combined production capacity is estimated at present at about 1.25m tonnes per year (t/y), while imports of steel

products has been averaging 5m t/y over the past three years. The gap between local production and demand is likely to widen as the pace of Middle East development quickens.

Recognising that only a concerted effort to upgrade Gulf steel production infrastructure during the current decade could prevent the growth of costly imports, the Doha conference recommended that the seven states should strive to produce at least 60 per cent of their projected 10m t/y needs by 1990. Although the will to develop regional cooperation was evident, it seems that the 60 per cent target remains out of reach.

The problems facing the aspiring Gulf iron and steel manufacturers also affect other Middle Eastern states such as Syria, Jordan and Egypt, as well as North African countries such as Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. Under the supervision of the Algerian ministry of heavy industry, IASM is helping to solve one of the most important of these problems, exchange of information.

'Since our documentation service started functioning some years back, we have a much clearer picture of what is really going on in different Arab countries,' says Salah. The institute is now in regular contact with most steel producing factories in the Arab world, keeping close tabs on current operations as well as future projects.

Salah believes that building up a powerful Arab metallurgical industry is absolutely essential. 'In the not too distant past, Arab economic planners were not agreed on the fact that heavy industry — like iron and steel factories — was the essential building block necessary for the construction of an integrated and rational industrial infrastructure,' he says. 'Now, however, a general

consensus has started to emerge, and even Gulf economic experts feel that dependence on imported metal products could constitute a serious brake on development prospects.'

'Without a doubt,' says Salah, 'during the first phase of iron and steel production in the industrialising Arab world, costs are liable to be higher than in the industrialised world. It is not likely that Algeria's El Hadjar steelworks, for example, could produce a tonne of steel as economically as Nippon Steel or US Steel. But we must not lose sight of the fact that a number of factors, which can be gradually overcome, condition the high-cost production structure in Arab and Third World countries. Factories in these countries must often pay inflated bills for imported technology and expatriate personnel.'

The IASM director, nonetheless, is optimistic about the future. 'Let's not forget that industrialisation is a long-term affair, and as Arab producers achieve a better mastery over the industrial cycle of iron and steel, their costs will be considerably trimmed. I would even say that given the escalating cost of ocean transport, domestically produced metal products in the Arab world will be increasingly competitive with foreign production by the end of the century.'

Salah is very sceptical about the effects of the transfer of technology from western steelmakers to the Arab world. 'These companies are interested in maintaining their monopoly over key production processes, and talk of effective technology transfer rarely is translated into reality,' Salah says.

He believes that only by training Arab personnel in iron and steel production techniques can extensive dependence on foreign firms be limited. He points out that the Tunisian steelworks in the northern part of

the country at Menzel Bourguiba is now entirely staffed by Tunisian workers, technicians and engineers.

Salah thinks that Algerian experience in industrialisation could help other Arab countries avoid some of the shortcomings of cooperation with western firms. Instead of turnkey factories, Algeria imposes 'product in hand' contracts which oblige foreign companies to train local personnel and ensure that the plant functions according to specifications before pulling out.

'The Arab world could even become a net exporter of steel products by the end of the century, especially to sub-Saharan Africa,' says Salah. Already Tunisia, Algeria and Egypt are exporting — even to Western Europe — a number of steel products. With cheaper Arab labour this trend could be amplified.

Salah is firmly convinced that expansion will be the watchword for Arab iron and steel ventures in the next two decades. He listed a number of new schemes planned in the Gulf:

● **Bahrain:** a 25,000 t/y bar plant to convert scrap metal is now under construction.

● **Kuwait:** a feasibility study for a 100,000 t/y bar rolling mill has been completed by the Kuwaiti Industrial Bank, and awaits the go-ahead from the government.

● **Oman:** the sultanate is expected to approve an iron and a steel plant with a production capacity of 400,000 t/y of sponge iron, of which 150,000 t/y would be earmarked for the manufacture of rolled products such as bars. A feasibility study is thought to have impressed the Omani government.

● **UAE:** Abu Dhabi has commissioned a feasibility study for a 500,000-900,000 t/y iron and steel complex, producing sponge

Installed raw steel production capacities and planned ones for 1990 (thousand tons)

country	installed capacities (1980)	capacities being installed	capacities to install	total capacity (1990)	%
Saudi Arabia	140	800	940	940	21.4
Bahrain	—	25	—	25	0.5
United Arab Emirates	111	840	—	951	21.8
Iraq	460	—	1,000	1,460	33.2
Kuwait	116	—	100	216	4.9
Oman	—	—	400	400	9.1
Qatar	400	—	—	400	9.1
Total Arab Gulf	1,227	1,665	2,440	4,392	100

iron, some of which is to be exported to India, with the rest being used as throughput for planned electric steelmaking furnaces. In addition, Abu Dhabi is considering the construction of a 40,000 t/y steel tube plant.

● **Saudi Arabia:** by far the most ambitious regional project is the Jubail steelworks, under the aegis of the Saudi Iron and Steel Company. The initial production target calls for 850,000 t/y of billets to supply downstream rolling mills. Facilities will include two direct iron ore reduction modules for producing sponge iron, a gas desulphurisation plant, a pelletisation mill and a 400,000-tonne ore storage yard. Total investment is put at Saudi riyals 2bn (\$585m).

CSO: 4500/41

MINISTER OF EDUCATION INTERVIEWED ON BASIC INSTRUCTION PROGRAM

Algiers EL DJEICH in French No 220, Sep 81 pp 7-9

[Interview with Mohamed Cherif Kherroubi, minister of education and basic instruction; date and place not given]

[Text] Basic instruction, now in its second year, is one of the most important decisions concerning education made by the political leaders.

Given the importance of this institution, Mohamed Cherif Kherroubi, member of the Central Committee and minister of education and basic instruction, was interviewed.

The interview dealt with methods of applying this new system of education, its goals and prospects and the means used.

Basic instruction was not instituted in order to provide a solution to the problem of bilingualism, but in addition, to extend compulsory education from six to nine consecutive years and thereby create, based on an analysis of the negative points of the old system, a balance between educational systems, the demands of development and the country's real conditions.

We are convinced that this new orientation will enable us to kill two birds with one stone: By taking advantage of the resource which our young people signify, we shall correct the country's lack of skilled technical workers and put an end to the educational "waste" that fills our streets every year.

[Question] Minister, basic instruction was instituted in order to solve the problem of bilingualism in education. How is its application progressing and what problems have you encountered?

[Answer] Basic instruction was not instituted solely for the purpose of solving this problem of bilingualism, but also of solving the problems of the young people who leave school at age 14. Compulsory education was six years. Basic instruction now puts it at nine and thereby provides an overall solution: unification of education, extension of schooling and the abolition of the image that idle young people filling the streets created. As education gave them little, they could not fit into active life. On the other hand, after the nine years provided by the basic education, our young people will be old enough and have a solid enough base to permit them either to continue their studies or fit into active life. They will be old enough and have solid knowledge.

With respect to problems, they do exist, but this is completely natural in the case of any change, whether in education or other sectors.

In decreeing the establishment and application of basic instruction, the Central Committee was quite aware of the problems that would arise: first of all, the problem of the school infrastructure, especially since the extension of schooling to nine years demanded further development; second, the retraining of teachers for the new model and new methodology.

For this first year of basic instruction, we proceeded to retrain all the first-year teachers. With respect to inspectors and advisers, whose number has considerably increased (over 1,200), we organized two seminars for them during the year.

We can therefore say that basic education has yielded a new boost and breathed new life into the Ministry of Education and Basic Instruction.

[Question] There can be no doubt that with the application of basic instruction, needs for school facilities, books and personnel will be greater than ever. What have you planned in order to meet these needs?

[Answer] Actually, I have already answered the first part of the question on the infrastructure, but I should like to pose a question also: Is basic instruction in general necessary or not?

In my opinion, it is necessary and we are forced to opt for it if we want to avoid losing in the future that asset which our young people represent. These young people who do not finish school are in the streets, where in one or two years they lose what they have learned because their basic training is not solid enough. Furthermore, as a result of their age, they cannot get jobs or enter the professional training centers.

Between now and 1984, we shall have hundreds of thousands of children in the streets and it is absurd that the education we provide should run counter to the demands of national development. Consequently, basic instruction is a need, whether we like it or not, and we must face up to it if we truly want the democratization of education. We are aware of everything that has to do with the field of education directly or indirectly, and all factors are taken into consideration in the 5-year plan. Concerning the construction of new schools, we have to continue the operation even if we have to use prefabricated buildings. Last year's experience, although for a relatively short period of time, was thoroughly satisfactory.

Concerning textbooks, we have already proceeded to change the content and methodology of the first-year books. Those for the second year have just been finished and will be distributed immediately. The third-year books are being prepared and we are taking the new methods into consideration, methods that we have applied to all subjects taught (languages, figuring) and to the aspect of the psychic and physical development of the child.

Moreover, we are mastering the training of teachers, and in some subjects, it has gone from one to two years, which will make it possible for future teachers to

better assimilate the new methodology. In keeping with the new orientation, all governmental organs are fully convinced of the need to work to attract and encourage young people and cadres and consequently, thank heaven, the problem of the lack of teachers will no longer be posed, especially with the large number of high school graduates who will enter the training institutes every year. This year, we trained nearly 13,000. Moreover, we shall have the aid of the young people called up for National Service, who, as soon as they have finished their military instruction, will go into teaching. This contribution will be especially beneficial for the poor wilayate [governorates] in the south and on the high plateaux.

[Question] Will the assignment of young people called up for National Service begin this year?

[Answer] Yes, and that will take place gradually. We have concluded an agreement with the High Commission for National Service: A teacher called up for National Service will be directly assigned to education following his military training.

In this way, they will perhaps be able to train new teachers themselves.

[Question] With the application of the basic instruction, it is expected that in the future, there will be the problem of girls in technical education and their active life subsequently. How do you view this problem?

[Answer] The problem does not actually exist insofar as we already have several professional training centers reserved for girls and the results are substantial. However, the most important point for us is that every boy and girl will acquire, during their nine years of education, the main bases of their chosen technical training, whether it be carpentry, electricity, or whatever.

After that, and in keeping with the program of professional training applied, they will be guided, depending on their inclinations and aptitudes, either toward technical secondary education or professional training. There, they will receive a higher-level education than at present.

Naturally, there will be training centers and technical centers where the specific areas of specializations of girls will be taken into account.

[Question] The orientation has been the center of your concern this year. How are preparations going and how will that orientation take place?

[Answer] From the standpoint of the basic instruction, the academic orientation is the structuring of the democratization of education -- that is, the democratic organization of education by giving democratization its true meaning. Over the course of his nine years, the student serves the apprenticeship of the trade he has chosen for two or three hours a week. For that purpose, every school will have a small workshop. Throughout the nine years, the student is regularly followed through an annual activity record which will subsequently make it possible to analyze his aptitudes and inclinations: theoretical or practical studies, electricity, design or carpentry. In the light of that record, he is guided, after the first nine years, either toward general secondary education, which prepares

him to enter the university, or toward the technical lycees from which he will graduate with a diploma orienting him toward the technical and scientific schools or the industrial establishments. Finally, the last outlet are the professional training centers. This is the real structuring of the democratization of education, based on the desires and aptitudes of each pupil.

After these different phases, it is absolutely necessary to create a bond and establish coordination between the different institutions so as to enable deserving students graduating from the training centers to enter the institutions of higher learning and to organize sessions for graduates working in the factories, which will allow them to go to the university. Only in this way will we truly succeed in democratizing education in keeping with the country's conditions. The method we are now using is not democratic at all and I would even say quite frankly that it borders on anarchy. Everyone wants to go to the university. We do not need them. Between now and 1984, we shall have 1 million pupils in the intermediate level of education. Will all of them go on to secondary schools? Will all of that number then go on to the university? If democratization of education is to follow the inclinations and competency of every child, it must also meet the country's needs.

In that way, every student will find a field for his ambition. A student working in the fields or factories and who is excellent and demonstrates his competency will see the doors of the universities and higher institutes open before him.

[Question] Mr Minister, the point concerning orientation is very important. Our view is that of all wali [provincial governors] at their last meeting, to the effect that their governorates are short of skilled workers in technical fields. The future application of this point will therefore respond to their needs.

[Answer] Actually, we are now seeing congestion in some disciplines. For example, there are thousands of jurists, just as there are in the literary disciplines. What are we to do with them? We can therefore say that there is no academic orientation. At a time when we have 4 million children in basic instruction, some 70,000 to 75,000 in higher education, professional training has but 30,000. The rest fill the streets. There is therefore no balance, no harmony. This is not normal.

[Question] In our opinion, Mr Minister, the orientation and distribution of pupils among the different outlets demands a certain coordination with the other ministries involved.

[Answer] That is true. And there are now coordinating commissions between us and the offices of secretary of state for professional training and secondary and technical education. It is necessary to coordinate our efforts in order to plan school programs, needs for professional training and the requirements of general secondary or technical education.

[Question] The problem of methodology and the content of schoolbooks has existed for a long time. A large number of books do not reflect true conditions in Algeria. What do you think of this, Mr Minister?

[Answer] In the new methods that we have introduced, we consider the scientific aspect and the pedagogical aspect and we thereby facilitate the task of the teacher and the pupil. The books must be clear, precise and written in the national language, a language that is not foreign to the child. We have also done away with all that was superfluous, things that only burdened the program from the pedagogical standpoint. Concerning the subject of figuring, it is absurd that children should should continue to count in the traditional way using his fingers or sticks, without using his head.

We have therefore adopted a method that requires the child to use his mental faculties from the very first year of basic instruction. This method is useful for the development of his faculties and accustoms him to reflexion and deduction.

By giving a certain balance to the academic programs, we have given the scientific and expressive aspects their true value. For example, we have introduced a new pedagogical and scientific method in the study of history. The old programs have been done away with because they granted little importance to certain important points of our history. We have also given civic instruction a pedagogical aspect that will enable the child to better understand the attachment to the Arab-Muslim personality.

The same is true of national education in general. We tend to simplify the country's charters in order to give every child a true national education. When he takes up the study of the history of civilization and the experiences of others, he will do so with a true national personality taking the country's circumstances into account.

[Question] Since you speak of the Algerian personality, I believe that the fundamental school can consolidate one of its main component parts, to wit, the national language and the elimination of bilingualism.

[Answer] The problem with bilingualism is that when man invents, he does not invent with his language, and the man who does not invent with his language never does more than imitate.

That is one thing. Furthermore, with the application of basic instruction, we restore trust between the child and his national language and he can study sciences, mathematics, physics, chemistry, and so on, in his language.

Some have said in the past that these subjects could not be taught in Arabic. Today they all are and with a new method, just as with all other subjects. The apprenticeship of foreign languages is also accomplished with a new functional Algerian method.

A language is not learned out of a love for it, but for the benefit one can derive from it. By adding one or two foreign languages to the knowledge of each child, we balance education and prepare a new generation, a generation open to a strong personality, impregnated with national values, capable of deriving the best from other civilizations and enriching them at the same time. That is the distant goal of basic education.

[Question] A final word?

[Answer] Basic instruction is for everyone because as I have already said, it alone can reflect all problems and all the contradictions which our young people experience. It alone makes it possible to make use of that true resource that is being lost in the streets. Consequently, everyone must make his own contribution. I should like to take advantage of this opportunity to tell parents that basic education is in the interest of their children. It assures them of nine years of school, raises the level of education and also makes it possible to acquire a strong national personality. For its success, we need the aid of all parents. They must trust the ministry, the government and the political leaders who have decided upon this policy, a wise policy capable of solving all their problems.

I would also like to thank teachers and training personnel who have made considerable efforts this year. Our education has now reached a stage where it can create a true education revolution alone, without any foreign aid.

11,464

CSO: 4519/21

ALGERIA

BRIEFS

ROMANIAN DELEGATION VISITS--A delegation from Romanian radio and television recently paid a working and friendly visit to Algeria during which it conducted a series of talks with national radio and television officials on cooperation between the two establishments. The two sides agreed to exchange radio and television programs between the two countries and to carry out research in the political, economic and cultural life in the two countries. The Romanian radio and television delegation was received by Algerian Minister of Information and Culture Boualem Bessaiah, in the presence of 'Abd al-Rahman Laghouat, the director general of Algerian Radio and Television. [Text] [LD270146 Algiers Domestic Service in Arabic 1200 GMT 26 Oct 81]

CSO: 4504/61

HISTORY OF PAST DECADE IN PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY DISCUSSED

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 20 Aug 81 p 6

[Article by 'Abd-al-Jawad 'Ali: "What Does the First Study on the Achievements of the People's Assembly During 10 Rich Years Say?"]

[Text] The first scientific study on the People's Assembly activity in the course of 10 years rich with activity and achievement reveals that fiscal policy had an effect on social policy, and that although the peace process cut off Arab aid, international aid nonetheless covered this aspect. A transformation in general ideological attitudes also occurred with the demand that the private sector take more extensive part in confronting the basic problems of society, that the policy of economic liberalization be pursued, and that the multi-party system be adopted. This was reflected in the view the government and the members of the People's Assembly had on social reality, as influenced by the housing problem in the first place, in a manner whose effects were consequently reflected on young people hoping to get married. The members of parliament hoped to put a stop to the migration of skilled labor abroad, due to the country's need for them to deal with the deterioration that had afflicted public utilities and was an inevitable consequence of the socialization of education -- which was a main cause of the scarcity of skilled manpower.

Three researchers, Dr 'Ali Laylah, Mrs Ulfat Husayn Agha and Mrs Najwa Husayn Khalil, carried out this study on three stages in the period 1970-1980.

The First Stage: from 1970 to 1973

The study stressed that this period was marked by numerous political changes which occurred among members of the ruling elite. The effect of this was to have repercussions on influential sociopolitical leaders with long-range objectives. This is made clear by the number of cabinets that came to power in this period. With the successive cabinet changes in this period, we find that the average life of cabinets filling the rudder of affairs came to about 8 months -- an extremely short period which is not of much use in carrying out social policies with long-range strategic goals. The basic goals whose slogans are raised by each ministry also vary, and this underlines the lack of continuity in the social policy that each cabinet commits itself to. That is reflected in the fact that the same problems appeared in all these cabinets' statements, but in a more complicated fashion the more we advanced in time.

As a result of all that, these cabinets generally constituted new beginnings which promised great hopes, but the achievements were generally scanty, in view of the time

period [required] for social change.

The Effect of Money

In addition, this period was distinguished by an instability in ideological orientation. The effect of this was reflected on social policy; while the main goal of each cabinet used to be to bring about a socialist transformation, this evolved into different goals represented by the attainment of local development, economic liberalization, agricultural development basically to cope with industrial development, and comprehensive planning.

In addition to that, successive cabinets during this period concentrated on coping with the revenue deficit involved in the financing of basic development plan projects or their projects. The main reason, in this state, might have been the war and war preparations before 1973; because of its limited resources, the government relied on Arab aid to support certain development plan projects, and reliance was placed on foreign aid to support other projects in a subsequent stage.

The financial dimension had an extreme effect on Egyptian social policy. The peace process led to the cutoff of Arab aid from Egypt and therefore in some development projects reliance was placed on international aid. Consequently, the international dimension came to be imposed by events, and this generally had an effect on the social policy followed to develop and advance society; this policy focussed on resolving problems of education, housing, labor and insurance and rebuilding Egyptian man.

Among the discussions that went on in the People's Assembly on these problems, the study emphasized that the problem of education received 35 percent of the attention, housing 19 percent, and labor 16 percent, followed by insurance.

The study specified that the most important feature in this period was a modest shift in the nature of the ideological orientation which appeared ultimately to stress the importance of private projects and professionals and of inviting foreign and Arab capital to take part in coping with such basic problems as housing. Interest in luxury housing was conspicuous.

The approach to the problems that plagued the situation in Egypt was distinguished by superficiality in reviewing problems and a failure to try to review them scientifically in terms of their size and the possibility that they might grow and to adopt a suitable strategy to cope with them and define their causes and current and probable effects; the review of problems stopped at the level of subjective impressions which were not supported by scientific data. The emphasis on liberating Arab territories in their entirety and intensifying efforts for the military struggle was also clearly apparent.

The Second Stage: From 1974 to 1977

This period reflected specific features such as the establishment and implantation of the economic liberalization policy and the shift from the single party to the multi-political party system. This in turn created an effect on the vision the government and the members of the People's Assembly had of Egyptian social conditions with their ongoing social problems. We find that it represented a social policy whose features were distinct from the previous stage, especially since the government had

gone through the military struggle and achieved victory in it during that stage, then ended up with the declaration of the peace initiative and the raising of social slogans to solve the problems of Egyptian society and bring about welfare.

In this period, the order of concern with social problems and issues changed. Whereas the attention had been more toward education as a social problem, the housing problem came to have priority and to be the most pressing problem, imposing itself on the discussion that went on in the assembly, of which it accounted for about 33 percent. It was also observed that awareness and attention to the limits and causes of the housing problem increased, in light of the serious social effects it possessed. Alongside this, there emerged attention to the collapse of housing and the deterioration of utilities, along with the relationship between landlord and tenant, the rights of tenants of dwellings that were about to collapse and the emergence of the problem of key money and advance rent payments. A tendency which arose from this problem also emerged: this was the declaration that the housing problem had become a problem threatening people's security, threatening public health, indeed threatening morality. The government's statement before the assembly in November 1976 stressed that key money and apartment prices rose the more the housing and building materials shortage became aggravated.

Opposition to Emigration

The labor question received 15 percent of the members' attention. The members' treatment of the problem was on a par with the solutions presented, since the problem had become understood during the first stage. The problem was described in terms of agricultural and skilled labor and its shortage and high wages, alongside government policy, which laid emphasis on encouraging the emigration of workers abroad and the continuous training of new technical staffs which would meet the deficit. However, the opposition attacked this policy and demanded that the emigration of technical workers abroad be limited since the country needed them.

The Third Stage: From 1978 to 1980

In this period, the country passed through a historic turning point toward the establishment of peace in the Middle East. This period witnessed the signing of the peace agreement between Egypt and Israel and slogans were raised on the promotion of peace, welfare and democracy. During this period, the National Democratic Party was also formed, under the chairmanship of President Anwar al-Sadat.

In this period the government programs concentrated on adherence to the principles of the 23 July and 15 May revolutions, on commitment to democratic socialism as an economic and political basis for the regime, on bringing about a sound balance between the interests of the individual and the interests of the group on the one hand and the material and spiritual needs of man on the other, and then on the call for adherence to the multi-party system as an expression of democracy and consultation and establishment of political activity founded on an objective opposition committed to social peace and national unity as a necessary element in the exercise of democratic rule.

As regards issues of concern, the housing problem headed the list of social issues. The government presented a true picture of the size of the problem, declaring that its policy would be based on encouraging the private and cooperative sectors and

removing all restrictions on their activity so that they could bear the main burden in solving this problem, while providing construction materials through production and import. In this period the government did not emphasize common housing.

The subject of the private sector's role in solving the housing problem stirred numerous discussions and contradictory views. Some members doubted this sector's ability to play an effective role in eliminating the housing shortage, proceeding from the premise that the public sector, in spite of its ongoing contributions, had not solved the problem because the issue of housing was much too great and the private sector was only a group of individuals who had some savings and wanted to invest them to make a profit.

The Peace Stage

In another area, the problem of determining rents on real property built in haste during that period stood out. Views on this approach differed. There were people who saw fit to refuse to continue lowering the rental value of properties, proceeding from the premise that the notion of justice was to preserve the national wealth in the building sector, especially since the owners of buildings had neglected them after their rental value had ceased to represent an income worth preserving. The argument of people who were in favor of continuing to lower the rental value on properties was founded on the point that increasing rental values would constitute a burden on tenants at a time when prices were increasing not just for owners but also for everyone living on Egyptian territory.

The solutions proposed for solving the housing problem took the greatest share of the members' discussions, coming to 45 percent of the total in comparison with talk about the limits and causes of the problem, the social effects arising from it, and the obstacles in the way of an effective housing policy.

In this period the opposition (the Labor Party) recommended that the housing problem be solved by establishing simple housing models consisting of a single room and bathroom for a family starting out in life, then two rooms for a family whose size grew beyond that, assuming that a single room would be better than tents or graves. All public sector companies would have to mobilize their efforts to provide one-or two-room low-cost and ordinary housing and not high-rise buildings that people with limited incomes could not live in.

The policy of deeding apartments also stirred up lengthy discussion because it was necessary to think about citizens who were not able to make down payments or subsequent payments on deeds. The materials for luxury housing were also to be imported from abroad and local building materials were not to be used in it. The rental on ordinary housing was to be reasonable and the government was to take over and mobilize all the public sector's government construction capabilities on its behalf.

Compulsory Education

In another area, the issue of education enjoyed the concern of the government and People's Assembly members during this period in its statements. The government stressed that it was trying to stem sources of illiteracy by enrolling all children of compulsory ages and linking education to production needs, the attainment of

welfare and the opening of higher education for outstanding graduates of technical secondary schools and technical training institutes.

The conclusions of the analysis of People's Assembly activities during this period revealed an obvious change in the nature of ideological orientation from that which had prevailed in the first stage of the research, once the importance of building a socialist society as an extension of the period before 15 May 1971 had become obvious and the need for economic liberalization and the role of the private sector in solving many social problems such as the problem of housing had become prominent, along with a clear orientation toward the stage of peace, the takeoff toward establishment of welfare, and the takeoff toward confronting crushing social problems in a decisive manner that did not contradict the comprehensive policy the transition toward a peacetime economy required. The role of a strong objective opposition that could offer proof and evidence of the failure of certain government approaches to solving crushing social problems and would ultimately refuse to vote on the side of the government program because in its view it would not solve the masses' problems also became prominent.

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PAPER OFFERS PREVIEW OF LATEST CABINET SHUFFLE

Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 21 Sep 81 p 1

[Article: "A Limited Cabinet Shuffle Is To Be Announced before Monday"]

[Text] A change was to have been made in some cabinet posts and positions of govern-
orates on a limited scale, at the end of this month, after conclusion of the sessions
of the general national conference of the National Party.

It was then decided that the limited change would be made before the convening of the
party's conference next Monday so that the party conference could meet and the
people to whom the new positions were assigned could take part in it.

It is expected that the shift will be declared soon, before the conference convenes.

Cabinet Posts to the Two People's Assembly Vice Chairmen

So far it seems probable that cabinet posts will be assigned to Muhammad Rashwan and
Muhammad 'Abd-al-Hamid Radwan, the two vice chairmen of the People's Assembly.

That was decided on grounds that they should engage in executive responsibilities
now that they have acquired political and legislative expertise in parliament,
especially in the factfinding committees that most thoroughly pursued their activity
concerning numerous general problems that the People's Assembly was to submit to
the factfinding committees under the chairmanship of both.

A New Vice Chairman of the People's Assembly

In commitment to the foregoing thought, which is that party staffs should be trained
in various types of responsibility, it was decided that a current cabinet member
should be assigned parliamentary responsibility in the People's Assembly, and the
party leaders recommended him for the position of vice chairman of the People's
Assembly. This nomination will be presented to the parliamentary board of the
National Democratic Party, as will the nomination of the second vice chairman of
the People's Assembly, who will represent the workers and peasants.

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AL-SADAT DISCUSSES RECENT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Cairo MAY in Arabic No 31, 28 Sep 81 pp 3,5

[Report on interview of Anwar al-Sadat by Ibrahim Sa'dah: "Public Opinion Inquires and al-Sadat Responds"; date and place not specified]

[Text] The subject of Arab newspapers that have no concern but to make a mountain out of a molehill, as people say, is a very strange one! There is no Arab newspaper that has not devoted its pages to publishing its fantasies, which it calls news, concerning the comprehensive cabinet reshuffle it alleges President Anwar al-Sadat intends to declare in a few days.

Many months ago Arab newspapers were following up on this fantasy and prominently displaying their expectations of it every day, as if it was a real fact!

How many reasons have these papers advanced to justify the new cabinet reshuffle! Some people stressed that President al-Sadat was not happy with the current cabinet, because it did not realize its goals, and others asserted that the goal in the change was to replace the cabinet with another one headed by a strong man who could govern the country by iron and fire, lest any one raise his voice and say "no!"

The Arab newspapers are living under the illusion that Egypt is in a state of being threatened with a blow up at any moment. Nothing these papers publish goes beyond some lies revolving about a single narrow focus; they talk about attempts to overthrow the regime, sometimes by force, sometimes by peace, sometimes by bombs that explode, by which thousands of people fall as victims, sometimes by bombs whose identity and location are discovered a few seconds before they explode, and by acts of repression and terror that never stop or end.

Egyptians read these papers and wonder where that Egypt they write about, and whose events they talk about, is to be found. The Egyptian reader imagines that he is the last to know what is going on in his country. He does not hear about a single coup attempt except from what he reads in these newspapers. He does not hear about the explosion of a single bomb in the area of Cairo he lives in, as the newspapers specify, and whose victim he has been. The Egyptian papers do not mention a word about the bombs it was possible to defuse and keep from exploding a few seconds before they were timed to go off!

The Arab newspapers have not contented themselves with what they have written on the new cabinet. They have asserted that President al-Sadat will order the dissolution

and reconstitution of the People's Assembly and the Consultative Assembly! Not just that -- indeed, these papers have ventured to predict what the names of the members of the new cabinet will be. What is funny is that these newspapers differ among themselves, their news conflicts, and their expectations are remote from one another. One paper published the statement that Nabawi Isma'il is to be the new prime minister, and another paper, issued on the same day, came out and asserted that President Anwar al-Sadat would form a cabinet and would assign the premiership to Mansur Hasan and that Nabawi Isma'il would go out of it! Then a third paper eliminated Nabawi Isma'il and Mansur Hasan from the new cabinet and anticipated that the former would assume the chairmanship of the People's Assembly while the latter would be given the position of second vice president! A fourth paper, more generous than those three, ventured to stress that President al-Sadat would relinquish the chairmanship of the National Party to Mansur Hasan!

The only thing that has preoccupied Arab papers in recent days concerns what they call the struggle for power in Egypt. They have asserted that the new cabinet formation would eliminate everyone who had participated in this alleged struggle!

The Egyptian newspapers, for their part, published information about the cabinet reshuffle but were specific and said that it, that is, the modification, would be extremely limited; then they were clearer and stressed that it would involve only three ministers!

The Arab newspapers seized at this explanation, which had turned their expectations on their heads, and said that President al-Sadat would assign the cabinet to Mansur Hasan on grounds that he was the closest of all to the president's heart and mind, specifically in the period that has most recently passed!

Then the very limited ministerial change was announced.

It brought in the three new ministers -- Muhammad Rashwan, Mukhtar Hani and Muhammad 'Abd-al-Hamid Radwan. One minister left, Mansur Hasan; he was nominated for the position of vice chairman of the People's Assembly!

All the expectations of the Arab newspapers were dashed.

Rather than being embarrassed about their news, which had turned out not to be true, or their expectations, which were not realized, we were surprised to see the newspapers exploiting Mansur Hasan's situation and his departure from the cabinet in the oddest and worst manner.

These papers unanimously declared that Mansur Hasan had recently been transformed from the person closest to the heart and mind of President al-Sadat to the most intense critic and opponent of his recent policies! Mansur Hasan, whom they had previously asserted would head the next Egyptian cabinet, has now in their view become an opponent and protestor, because of President al-Sadat's excessive confidence in him, -- a man rejecting the latest measures to which the people agreed by an overwhelming majority!

The young official who was close to the head of state in the past few years and enjoyed his complete affection, enthusiasm and guidance, has now, by their pens, been

transformed in their papers into another person whom Mansur Hasan himself does not recognize!

Once again, they have given their horses free rein.

They have published the statement that the "isolation" of Mansur Hasan took place because of his opposition to the policy of repressing and striking out at the opposition. They really did! And after the discovery of his firm bonds with the leaders of the Moslem Brothers!

The wierdest thing they had to say about Mansur Hasan was published in the newspaper AL-SAFIR, issued in Lebanon with the money of the wretched people of Libya. It said that the reason for the "isolation" may be sought in the good relations that he had with a correspondent with the French newspaper LE MONDE and an American television correspondent, who were recently thrown out of Egypt!

Another paper wrote that Mansur Hasan's banishment came as a result of his dealing lightly, as minister of information, with journalists who were opposed to the regime and criticized the policy of the Egyptian government at home and abroad! The same paper went on to say that Mansur Hasan has been rebuked for advocating liberalism and not being sufficiently decisive in the Ministry of Information or the Ministry of Culture!

Mansur Hasan's departure from the cabinet has been the talk of Egyptian public opinion. It is true that public opinion did not attribute the departure of the young minister from the cabinet to the reasons bruited about by hostile Arab papers; however, which is also true, public opinion did not know the reason behind Mansur Hasan's departure from the cabinet.

I brought Egyptian public opinion's queries before President Anwar al-Sadat.

I asked:

"People are wondering, Mr. President, about the reason for Mansur Hasan's departure from the cabinet; in other words, was the sole purpose of the latest ministerial change to expel Mansur Hasan from the cabinet?"

President al-Sadat replied,

"The fact is that I heard this question the first time going about on the tongues of my children at home. My children read the news in the papers like any ordinary citizen. They are not very interested in politics, and I am very happy about that. I have not wanted anyone in my home to be active in politics. Preoccupation with politics, as I have learned, is a very oppressive and difficult process. Fortunately, my children are not interested in politics and none of them have thought of being involved with it.

"When the cabinet change was published in the papers, the children came and asked me the same question you are asking now. Mansur Hasan was the only person who had left the cabinet. Can you imagine that the goal in that change was to remove Mansur!

"My children's interest in this subject, in spite of their lack of interest in political matters, as I have said, might be attributable to their personal acquaintance with Mansur Hasan. He is related to my family by marriage and our relations are not those of close collaborators -- they are family relations at the same time."

I told the president,

"Public opinion has not commented on the cabinet change and has not paid attention to the shifts of governors. All it is concerned with is to know the reason for Mansur Hasan's departure from the cabinet! That is a question that has been repeated by people who are preoccupied with politics and by people who are not, at the same time."

President al-Sadat replied,

"Perhaps the reason for that interest may in general be attributed to the great amount written about this ministerial change before it was announced. People wrote and made predictions about it at length, giving public opinion the impression that the change would be comprehensive and fundamental. When the change was declared, public opinion was surprised to find that it was extremely limited and minor. It was previously published in MAY that the change would be very limited, but some people continued to imagine that the change would involve a large number of ministries and ministers."

I asked the president,

"What is the reason for this very limited change?"

The president replied,

"I do not embark on any decision or action unless I have purpose behind it. The change that occurred was very limited, but in it one can observe an emphasis on the People's Assembly and the National Democratic Party. There are three deputies in the People's Assembly who shone brilliantly under the cupola, and I chose them to work in the cabinet. These were Muhammad Rashwan, Mukhtar Hani and Muhammad Radwan. Rashwan and Hani have become ministers of state for People's Assembly and Consultative Assembly affairs, and Radwan is minister of culture.

"This shows that I want to train leaders by changing positions. A person who is trained in the People's Assembly will move to the cabinet. A person who is in the cabinet will go back to the party or the People's Assembly. And so on.

"Through this system, I am rearing the staffs we need. Naturally I do that only with the personnel that function actively and of whom we can say 'they have the political touch.' By those I mean people who have chosen political activity themselves and were not coerced into it.

"Such 'staffs' must shift from the cabinet to the party and the assembly. This is an integrated interconnected activity. This is the prime objective in the latest change. The second objective is to devote interest to and concentrate on the activity of the party and the activity of the People's Assembly."

I asked President al-Sadat:

"What is Mansur Hasan's position on this process, Mr President?"

The president replied,

"I am anxious to have public opinion understand that I do not surprise people with things they might not agree to. For example, if I choose someone for a certain position, I summon this person and announce this choice to him. If he agrees, then he takes the position, and if he refuses I look for someone else. Everyone who has dealt with me knows this about me. It has not happened that anyone has been surprised by having news of his appointment published in the papers before I broached this appointment to him first.

"The Sunday before last I was in 'Abidin Palace to receive the credentials of a number of new ambassadors to Cairo. Mansur Hasan was with me. I told him, 'I will make a minor change in the cabinet. The emphasis in the coming stage will be on the party and the People's Assembly. For this reason you will leave the cabinet and work as a vice chairman of the People's Assembly, because the two vice chairmen will enter the cabinet.

"This discussion between me and Mansur Hasan did not take more than what I just told you. This is what I always do with people who are in the position of a son toward me, like Mansur. When I talk to him about some subject I do not weigh every word I say to him. But when I talk with someone else with whom I do not have the relationship of a father to a son, I greatly weigh what I say to him, paying attention to his natural human reactions.

"Here I go back to the problem I am suffering from concerning the understanding and practice of democracy in our country. What really distresses me is that 99 percent of people active in politics nowadays fail to grasp the obvious principles for understanding and practicing democracy. What is amazing is that the Egyptian people, 70 percent of whom are said to be illiterate, can be considered among the smartest people in the world. These people have not misunderstood me once. There is not a decision I have taken that held the world in perplexity that the Egyptian people did not immediately understand and properly analyze, at a time when the people around me failed to understand it and collapsed, one after the other.

"The important thing is that my children came to me and asked me if the purpose in the cabinet change was to remove Mansur Hasan from the cabinet. The same question is being repeated by the man in the street everywhere. As I said, I do not weigh every word and every act while I am dealing with someone whom I consider just like one of my children -- and Mansur is one of them. Mansur Hassan came to meet me last Thursday here at the Barrages, and we found it necessary to discuss this subject which is being repeatedly discussed by public opinion in Egypt.

"Mansur told me, 'You previously broached this subject to me at 'Abidin Palace, and I did not object. I will work in any position you choose for me. I feel that my place is for you to decide as I am a son of yours, and the relationship between us is not just one of work but is also one between father and son. However, I tell you truthfully that I was hurt a little in front of people. The whole country has been

talking about the cabinet change that removed me alone from the cabinet, as if the change the whole country had been talking about for a long time was announced only to remove me alone.'

"I told Mansur, 'By God, you have the right, Mansur my son. This talk I have heard in the exact same words from my children before you came here. You are completely right about that, but my excuse is that I do not weigh everything with my children or people who are very close to me. Perhaps this is the reason some people consider that I am very hard with people who are close to me.' This is a fact. With my children, and people who are close to me, I deal without weighing things carefully. I have become completely tired of these calculations in my work and my contacts."

President al-Sadat continued to talk, saying,

"I go back to the exercise of the policy of democracy in Egypt, and say that his practice has become corrupted to the point where it is necessary to draw attention to it and work to change it. The simplest obvious points about political activity that are recognized everywhere in the civilized world are not being honored in our country. They must be carefully set down and we must issue a law making respect for them mandatory.

"I complain bitterly about the touchiness that some people are suffering from. These certain people place their dignity above their own skin and deal with life and engage in politics by their own personal standards. This plainly means a lack of political maturity.

"Then came the old political parties, which strove to implant these wrongful standards which emphasize the lack of political maturity we are complaining about.

"I personally suffered from this situation for the first time when I was a member of the Revolutionary Command Council. After the 23 July 1952 revolution, all the members of the Revolutionary Command Council entered the cabinet except one, and that was me. Everyone became a minister and assumed a cabinet position except me. I went for 13 months bearing the rank of Lt Col Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat and receiving the salary of a lieutenant colonel. I did not protest and did not feel that I had been dealt with disdainfully.

"In September 1954, Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir decided to form a cabinet and told me, 'You have to enter the cabinet with us -- it's not reasonable, Anwar, for you alone to stay out of it!' I told him, 'You know, Jamal, I am not concerned with this subject. My standards are different, as you know.'"

"The prevailing standard at that time was that a member of the Revolutionary Command Council who did not go into the cabinet was considered less important than one who did. This standard often provoked the anger of a number of Revolutionary Command Council members who had not entered the cabinet at the outset. They faced problems in their homes and among their friends which ended only when they later did enter the cabinet.

"I alone remained outside the cabinet until September 1954, when Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir insisted that I go into the cabinet in which all members of the Revolutionary Command Council had gone before me.

"In 1956 the Revolutionary Command Council was terminated, after Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir was elected president. My agreement with Jamal was that I would remove myself from the cabinet as soon as the Revolutionary Command Council was terminated, and Jamal was elected the first president of Egypt.

"On 23 July 1956, we celebrated Revolution Day at the Officers' Club and Jamal gave us the medal of the Nile, the highest decoration in Egypt, which is given to heads of state; thus ended the Revolutionary Command Council. Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir assumed the presidency. Jamal began to draw up his new cabinet, and did not include me in it, which is what I has asked of him. If we go back to the issue of AKHBAR AL-YAUM in which the news of the formation of the new cabinet was published, we will find on the headlines "'Three people have left.' I was the first of these three.

"'Three people have come in.' The names of the new ministers were given.

"This headline was published in a really provocative manner. Some people imagined that the persons who had been left out in the reshuffle were the subject of disapproval, for example, or were incompetent, or these people volunteered other reasons. This is the erroneous behavior I talked to you about."

I told the president,

"People did not know that it was you who asked 'Abd-al-Nasir not to include you in the reshuffle. Some people thought that you were surprised by your departure and consequently these people expected what they felt like expecting."

President al-Sadat said:

"The important thing is that I personally am not concerned and I do pay heed to what is said and bandied about. I had previously agreed to that arrangement with Jamal. Throughout my life, I have believed in a truth which is that the position never causes the person who occupies it to grow in size. I am just Anwa al-Sadat. No position will elevate me, and keeping me from a position will not diminish me.

"In the period I spent outside the cabinet after the revolution took place, I was talking with Jamal and told him, 'I consider myself a minister, a prime minister, because you yourself are a minister and prime minister, we are all part of the Revolutionary Command Council, and each of us represents the others. When you are elected president I will feel as if I am president just like you.'

"That was always my conviction, and these were my standards as far as positions went.

"Unfortunately, I have not encountered anyone who shared this conviction and these standards with me to this day, except for one person, Dr Mustafa Khalil. I swear that Mustafa Khalil went into the cabinet, then left it, and was not affected, embarrassed or shaken. He has an inner confidence in his abilities and that is greater than anything else. When he left the cabinet, his inner sense did not change at all. He continued to have confidence in his abilities and in himself. It is not the position that made him great or small."

I asked President al-Sadat:

"What did you tell Mr Mansur Hasan, Mr President, when he told you that he felt hurt at leaving the cabinet in the latest changes?"

The president replied,

"I admit that I actually did hurt Mansur. Of course I did not do so on purpose. I did not for a moment imagine that Mansur would not appreciate what I had arranged for him. When he came to meet me last Thursday I assured him of this and repeated to him that the emphasis would be on the party and the People's Assembly in the coming stage. When I nominated him as vice chairman of the People's Assembly, that was not to diminish his stature or hurt him, as some people imagined -- it was to get him to help me in what I wanted to concentrate on from now on out.

"I told Mansur 'I had supposed that in regard to you I had the right of a father who chooses for his son what he considers is suitable for him and sees to be in his interests. You say that you feel that you have been hurt. I agree with you on that now, and my excuse is that my standards differ greatly from those of other people.'

"This reminds me of what happened in 1957 when they called us to establish the National Assembly, and we all went to Burj al-'Arab to discuss the selection of candidates. We had the right to object, which was natural, considering that we had to provide insurance for the revolution in its early years. I remember that we were laughing about the reports that intelligence sent us on people who were nominated for membership in the assembly. For example, they wrote a report on one person saying 'He is very well-educated but does not know how to read and write.' In Borj al-'Arab, Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir told me, 'Be prepared, Anwar -- I have chosen you for the chairmanship of the assembly.' I did not object. Jamal chose me for that job in the belief that I was qualified for it. We all complement one another everywhere, but the real goal is for us all to cooperate and each work in the position the president sees fit to assign to him.

"We returned to Cairo.

"The inauguration of the People's Assembly was to take place in 2 days' time.

'Abd-al-Nasir was very anxious to know the details behind the details, and he demanded that we go to the National Assembly so that he could see what would happen on inauguration day, on the spot.

"He summoned us to his house in Manshiyat al-Bakri and told us, 'It is true that the Revolutionary Command Council has been terminated and that the people have chosen me to be president. Egypt is now to be governed by an ordinary constitutional system of government, but that does not prevent us from meeting together or prevent me from familiarizing myself with each of your opinions.

"Jamal then continued his conversation by saying,

"'You have come together today to prepare for the inauguration of the National Assembly tomorrow. In my opinion, we can agree that the person directly in the Revolutionary Command Council after me is the one who will chair the National Assembly, and I therefore consider that this position should go to 'Abd-al-Latif Bughdadi.'

"Bughdadi was the person directly after Jamal; he had precedence over Zakariya Muhyi-al-Din and had considerable precedence over 'Abd-al-Hakim 'Amir.

"After Jamal had expressed his opinion, he looked at me and asked me, 'What is your opinion, Anwar?' If I had exhibited the same touchiness that other people do, I would have been angry. Jamal had previously chosen me for this job, and suddenly he decided to give it to someone else. There must have been a consideration that Jamal found to be in the public interest and consequently I had no objection at all to his view. I told him, 'If it is in the general interest, I am in favor of it, Jamal.'

"As I had agreed, so did everyone.

"'Abd-al-Nasir then shifted to another matter bearing on the choice of two vice chairmen for the National Assembly. Jamal chose the late Fu'ad Jalal as the first vice chairman and asked us to choose the second vice chairman along with him. It was obvious that the old politicians who had not been corrupted, had not been included under the isolation decree and had won assembly elections had formed a bloc to win the seat of the vice-chairman of the assembly. It was Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir's opinion that we should confront this bloc, that the second vice chairman should be one of us and that we should not leave that position to some old politician who might not be compatible with us.

"The vice chairman's position is very important. When the chairman of the assembly is absent for any reason, the vice chairman takes his place, engages in his functions and acts as National Assembly chairman. The prime minister, all the ministers and all the people's representatives sit before him.

"Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir added that he had offered the position of assembly vice chairman to Dr Nur-al-Din Tarraf. Dr Tarraf was a star at that time, having been a National Party deputy in parliament before the revolution. However, he declined the position.

"He also offered it to Fathi Radwan, who also refused it. This refusal may be attributed to the fact that the two of them considered that this position was a reduction in their status. These are the same old worn out standards that I am suffering from and from whose touchy points I hope we can all save ourselves.

"Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir ended by saying, 'In my opinion, fellows, the issue is very serious and we have to face it. Therefore I consider that we should choose one of our number to be a vice chairman of the National Assembly. I recommend so-and-so, who is a member of the Revolutionary Command Council and still is alive.'

"We were in agreement with Jamal's view.

"The meeting ended and Jamal and Bughdadi agreed to meet in his office and go together to the National Assembly to do a 'rehearsal' of what was to happen the next day in its inaugural session.

"We left Jamal's house and the member we had chosen for the position of vice chairman of the assembly got into the car with me. As soon as the car started I was surprised to hear this colleague tell me, 'Oh what bad luck, Anwar!' I looked at him in amazement, and he continued talking, saying, 'I cannot agree to be vice chairman of the National Assembly. People will interpret it the wrong way.'

"I told him, 'Why don't you complain to 'Abd-al-Nasir?' He did not answer. However, he did ask me to intervene quickly and get him out of this predicament, especially since the inaugural session was to be the next day.

"I promised him that I would look for a solution.

"As soon as I got home I called Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir on the telephone. I was told that he was sleeping. I asked for 'Abd-al-Hakim 'Amir and told him what our colleague had told me and asked him to act quickly, as soon as Jamal woke up from his nap.

"I went into my office in the apartment where I was living in the al-Rawdah section and started to read something. Then at dusk the telephone rang and Jamal was on the line, asking me to meet him in his office, where he was sitting with Bughdadi.

"I left my house and went to 'Abd-al-Nasir's office.

"It was a short distance away and I was in 'Abd-al-Nasir's office in a few minutes. 'Abd-al-Latif Bughdadi was with him. I asked Jamal,

"'Did you see the rehearsal, Jamal?'

"He answered, 'No, actually not yet, Anwar, there is an important matter I would like to talk to you about.'

"'Well, Jamal?'

"He said, 'For heaven's sake, Anwar, our colleague so-and-so has refused to take the position of vice chairman of the People's Assembly.'

"I know. I was the one who informed 'Abd-al-Hakim of this fact so that he would pass it on to you.'

"Bughdadi was sitting there, in great agitation. Some people had told him that the persons who had refused to accept the vice chairmanship of the assembly had done so because they refused to work under him. For this reason distress and agitation were apparent on his face and he did not join in the conversation with us at the outset.

"I told Jamal,

"'Offer the position to someone else.'

"'I raised the matter again with Nur-al-Din Tarraf and Fathi Radwan, and they still refused.'

"What do you intend to do, Jamal?"

"'My view is that you yourself should agree to be an assembly vice chairman, Anwar. You are not a member of the cabinet, but you are a member of the National Assembly and you represent one of the 60 closed districts whose representatives we have chosen. I consider that you must agree to be a vice chairman of the assembly.'

"Once again what had happened at 'Abd-al-Nasir's house that day was repeated. The first time, he offered me chairmanship of the National Assembly, then changed his mind, hoping to set forth a gradition where the position of the chairman of the assembly would be given to the second man in the Revolutionary Command Council, and I agreed without the least hesitation or touchiness. The second time, Jamal thought it would be in the general interest for me to work as vice chairman of the same assembly for which he had previously nominated me as chairman, and I did not object, or feel that I was hurt or that my dignity had been slighted.

"Jamal quickly looked over at Bughdadi, who was sitting in front of him, and asked him,

"'Didn't I tell you, 'Abd-al-Latif, that Anwar's calculations are different from those of other people?'

"It was clear that 'Abd-al-Nasir had recommended my name to 'Abd-al-Latif before he got in touch with me by telephone. 'Abd-al-Latif said that Tarraf had refused, Fathi Radwan had refused, and so-and-so had refused, so was it reasonable that Anwar should accept? However, Jamal assured him that Anwar viewed things in another, different way, and was the most self-effacing person he knew in terms of positions and seats.

"He often declined executive jobs because he believed that the position of minister at that time was no more than a general directorship for employee relations!

"The meeting did not take more than a few minutes. We left the office for the National Assembly to see the 'rehearsal' of what was going to happen at the first inaugural session the next day.

"At that session, the measures for nominating the chairman and two vice chairmen of the assembly were put in movement. The representatives chose Bughadi as chairman and Fu'ad Jalal and me as the two vice chairmen.

"My work began most actively and with absorption.

"I felt no touchiness about accepting the position of vice chairman of the People's Assembly, though I am one of the nine who made the 23 July Revolution; the reason for that, as I said, was that I did not connect my own worth to the position I occupied or the chair I was sitting in. And what is wrong with being vice chairman of the National Assembly? The vice chairman stands in for the chairman when he is absent. I had agreed to be a National Assembly member for a district; what is the difference between being an assembly member and the vice chairman of that assembly? I remained vice chairman of the National Assembly until Egypt and Syria were united; then the assembly was dissolved and reconstituted. Then I ran as a candidate for assembly chairman, and the representatives chose me. I was then chosen chairman of the new National Assembly in 1964; it did not complete its term, because of the war."

I told President al-Sadat,

"I believe that few people who are engaged in political activity look at this matter the way you do. Perhaps this is the reason why some people have not put a favorable interpretation on Mansur Hasan's departure from the cabinet and his nomination as

a vice chairman of the People's Assembly."

The president said,

"This is the misfortune that I am suffering from. I have tried a great deal, with the people who worked with me, to persuade them that there should be no touchiness about jobs. Positions do not create political staffs, and chairs do not increase the importance of the people who sit on them. It is wrong for a person to link his worth and his weight to the position he occupies or to the chair he sits on. I have told this to everyone who worked, and works, with me, with the aim of removing the people who have been steeped in this erroneous conduct, which spread and took root many years ago.

"Most unfortunately, some people continue to imagine that a minister of state stands at a lower rank than a minister with portfolio. The ministers are very concerned about these formalities. I remember that I sent for one of them to offer him an appointment as minister, and was surprised when he protested and told me you appointed so-and-so to the position of deputy prime minister but I am not less than him, I worked as a minister previously!"

"My answer was to remove him from the cabinet.

"I also remember that I was once compelled to hold the first session of a new Council of Ministers in the town of East al-Qantarah. I chose this place specifically so that the cabinet members could see the extent of the destruction and devastation in this town as a result of the war. I told the ministers, 'These are the ruins of the battles we fought in the past. We must get rid of them and rebuild and reconstruct instead of destroying and devastating. This is the goal in forming the cabinet. I wanted to assure you of this here, in this place, having learnt that some of you met in one of your homes and discussed at length the difference between ministers with portfolio and ministers of state and between ministers and deputy ministers, which is something I totally reject.

"I related my experience with positions and how we were one of the nine who made the revolution but that in spite of that I did not feel the least touchiness or wounded pride in accepting the position of vice chairman of the People's Assembly for many years!

"I told them that I was in need of assistants who were concerned with the essence, not with appearances. Everyone sitting down with me at this table, from the prime minister to the deputy prime ministers, ministers with portfolio, ministers of state and deputy ministers, I consider on the same executive and leadership level. When we take the votes of cabinet members on a given matter, there is no difference between the vote of the prime minister and the vote of a deputy minister."

I told President al-Sadat:

"Some people do not easily agree to be assigned positions that are below the ones they previously occupied. These people's thinking is that a person should be promoted to a higher position, not demoted to a lower one."

The president replied,

"Exactly. This is the erroneous behavior I wish would vanish from our minds and hearts. In countries with a deep-rooted democracy, this kind of erroneous notion does not exist at all. Sometimes a prime minister resigns in one of those countries because he has a political or party commitment, but he finds no embarrassment in accepting the position of minister in a cabinet formed for the purpose of coping with an important national political position. There are prime ministers at the highest level who have nonetheless agreed to work as ministers without portfolio in subsequent cabinets, indeed have agreed to subordinate in these cabinets to people whom they had supervised and who had been directors of their offices!

"In these cases, a former prime minister should not be assigned a major cabinet post such as minister of the interior or minister of finance; rather, he should be honored by having a ministry of state assigned to him. The meaning of a minister of state is that he is not committed to a given ministry but is engaged in everything and speaks his opinions on every subject.

"These notions that are recognized in all civilized democratic countries are unacceptable to this day in our own. A minister of state is nothing! A minister must have a ministry, or must be a deputy prime minister if possible -- or a prime minister if given the chance!"

I asked the president,

"By what, Mr President, do you explain the spread of these notions among intellectuals and politicians in particular?"

President al-Sadat replied,

"My only explanation is that our politicians suffer from a vacuum. Some people say that young people are in a vacuum. I say that the politicians' vacuum is much more pronounced than that of the young people. Why? Because the most basic rules of the exercise of democracy among politicians in mature societies do not exist among us here. As I said, positions do not make sagacious politicians. Capable politicians are ones who make something out of their positions.

"The same thing is to be said about the failure of people who call themselves the opposition here in exercising democracy.

"Earlier, I related that I stopped off in Britain during my latest trip to the United States of America. In London I met with Michael Foot and Callaghan. Michael Foot is the new Labor Party leader and Callaghan is a former prime minister and a man of enormous political stature. Of course deep inside himself he has a great deal against Mrs Thatcher, the current prime minister. He came to meet me and asked me 'What is my government's position toward you? In my opinion, my country's position probably consists of these four points -- one, two, three, four. What do you think?'

"I told him, 'The four points you mentioned are exactly what we are thinking about, but there is a fifth point and a sixth point to fully round out the picture.

"Michael Foot, the opposition leader, came and asked the same question as Callaghan, and completely agreed with me that Mrs Thatcher's cabinet's position toward us was sound.

"Neither of them came to meet me to speak against the British government in my presence. I didn't hear a single word from former Prime Minister Callaghan against the current prime minister, Mrs Thatcher, in spite of the great differences between them.

"I find the same thing in the United States of America.

"We previously followed the harsh publicity campaigns between Carter and his adversary Reagan during the latest election campaign. Each of them said things about the other that one's intelligence could not grasp. As soon as the elections were over and Reagan won, everything that stood between the two men came to an end, to the point where I went to meet Carter in my latest visit to America and did not hear a single word from him against Reagan. Rather, to the contrary, he told me 'If you want anything that you see fit to tell me, I am fully prepared to go to Reagan at the White House and tell it to him.'

"When Carter made a visit to China at the beginning of this month, he made statements in Peking, but he committed himself to the line and policies which President Reagan had previously declared. He did not hurt Reagan, he did not defame him, he did not oppose his policies.

"This is the true exercise of opposition in politically civilized countries, not the sterile, improper exercise that some people here who call themselves the opposition have pursued.

"We can cast a glance at the style of conduct in Israel, for example. When Israel struck at the Iraqi nuclear reactor, that was a reckless act that Egypt attacked in the most violent possible manner. When they asked Begin about his decision to strike at the reactor, he said that he had previously informed the leader of the opposition about this action, and the opposition leader, Perez, actually did stand up and confirm that Begin had informed him of the operation of striking at the reactor before it was carried out. Perez added that he contacted Begin and declared his rejection of the operation.

"This happened many months before the strike against the Iraqi reactor. In spite of that, Perez did not say a word to anyone on that subject; they considered it a national secret which absolutely could not be divulged. Perez did not think about exploiting the situation in order to defame Begin in front of the whole world in the election campaign, which he lost.

"The question now is, Can I do here in Egypt as is done in Israel and trust any of the people who call themselves the opposition, tell him a national secret and demand that he keep it secret?

"No, no I can't!

"It is certain that this national secret will have begun to go about on every tongue in an hour and that the international news agencies will have passed it on to all areas of the world!

For this reason I absolutely do not trust those people who provoke quarrels with democracy and call themselves the opposition!

"The story of Mansur Hasan has given me a chance to let off a little steam and talk about what I am suffering from and hope to rid myself of."

OUTLINES OF ISLAMIC PROPAGATION PLAN REVEALED BY MA'ADIKHA

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 1 Nov 81 p 1

[Text] TEHRAN, (Pars) - After sessions with Islamic propagating institutions and after devoting almost 500 hours on studies on methods of propagation, "I have finally prepared a plan for establishing a coordinated propagation system and a strategy for activities of revolutionary and governmental organs," Hojatoleslam Maadikhah, the Minister of Islamic Guidance said yesterday.

He added that the plan would face no legal difficulties because preliminary executive measures had been taken in regard to the plan.

Maadikhah said that it was impossible to limit the Islamic and Revolutionary propaganda within a governmental and official framework. He added that in the new plan, propagation was not solely left to one organ or ministry.

The Islamic Guidance Minister stated that he would disclose details of this new plan after its approval by the Majlis. "But stated in broad outline I can say that there will be a central authority for determining general policies on propagation and this body will supervise their execution." However the minister said, the state's policies on propagation will be directed by the leader and executive authorities will manage their own responsibilities.

"A supreme Propagation Council comprising of the ministers of Islamic Guidance and Foreign Affairs, together with 5 more members who are

to be chosen by the leader, and or the leadership council, will also be formed which shall supervise ways of expending the States' propagation budget," Maadikhah said.

"It has been proposed", continued Maadikhah "that the total amount of the propagation budget be centralized in one organ, which will furnish the propagating institutions with their required budgets through the Supreme Propagation Council, after their propagation programs are approved. Thus through consolidating the efforts taken by various organs redundancies, waste of effort and finances will be avoided," he said explaining the need for the new Council.

Hojatoleslam Maadikhah also added that with regard to the significance of propagation and the need felt for coordination and supervision, the Supreme Council of Propagation and Coordinating Council of Propagation were already active with 6 members, all of whom had been approved by the Imam.

Asked of the number of organs that would be included in the plan, Maadikhah said that all organs and institutions that used the State's general budget for propagation such as the Ministry of Islamic Guidance, the Cultural Departments of the Foreign Ministry, Construction Crusade, IRGC and the Islamic Propagation Organization would be covered by the plan and that these organs were obliged to cooperate with the council according to the new

plan while the cooperation of other political and para-political organs rely on their own discretion, though it would also be compulsory for them to be guided in certain circumstances.

He was then asked to explain the manners in which the Voice and Vision of the Islamic Republic could cooperate in the plan while it was an independent organization and run by its own Supervisory Council.

The Islamic Guidance Minister said in reply that "the main principles of the Voice and Vision of the Islamic Republic relies on keeping to the genuine path of politico-ideological principles of the Revolution."

"But as I said it is only a general concept while the Supreme Council of Propagations is endowed through law with specific means to see that this principle is observed," he said. The Supervisory Council will continue as before but at the same time co

the same time cooperation can also be achieved he added. The Majlis has the authority to oblige all propagating organs and institution to cooperate according to the manner foreseen in the plan," he also said.

When asked how much time he thought was needed for the plan to be ultimately approved, the Islamic Guidance Minister, replied that with a view to the efforts taken by Majlis deputies for coordinating the state's propagations, he expected the plan to be approved when the next year's propagating budget is finally passed.

ECONOMIC, SCIENTIFIC TALKS OPEN WITH BULGARIA

JN091441 Baghdad INA in Arabic 1225 GMT 9 Nov 81

[Excerpts] Baghdad, 9 Nov (INA)--Iraqi-Bulgarian talks on economic, technical and scientific cooperation began here today.

The Iraqi side to the talks is headed by Taha Yasin Ramadan, Revolution Command Council [RCC] member and first deputy prime minister, while the Bulgarian side is headed by Todor Bozhinov, first deputy chairman of the Bulgarian Council of Ministers.

The Iraqi delegation comprises Hasan 'Ali, RCC member and minister of industry; 'Amir Mahdi, minister of agriculture and agrarian reform and head of the Iraqi delegation on the Iraqi-Bulgarian Joint Committee, and experts.

The Bulgarian delegation comprises Khristo Iliev Khristov, minister of foreign trade and head of the Bulgarian delegation on the Iraqi-Bulgarian Joint Committee; Alexander Petkov, chairman of the Executive Committee of the National and Industrial Union Central Council and minister of agriculture [title as received]; and experts.

At the beginning of the talks, Taha Yasin Ramadan welcomed the Bulgarian delegation and praised the progress achieved in the Iraqi-Bulgarian relations thanks to the leadership of President Saddam Husayn and chairman of the State Council Todor Zhivkov.

RCC member and Deputy Premier Ramadan called on the technical committees to formulate new and developed formulas for joint cooperation. He stressed that Iraq, while waging a battle against the racist Persians for the second year, continues to increase its strength, firmness and development in all spheres, whether in the military and development spheres or in the foreign relations.

Ramadan praised the Bulgarian people's positive stand on the Iraqi-Iranian conflict which commensurates with the magnitude of the event and confirms the strong relations between the two friendly countries.

In a reply speech, Bozhinov reiterated Bulgaria's support for Iraq's endeavors to solve the Iraqi-Iranian conflict through peaceful means and its stand against the Camp David policy and world Zionism. He said: We are pleased at Iraq's stability, development and progress despite the war circumstances. This clearly shows the

wisdom of its leadership. He expressed his confidence that the current meetings will attain fruitful results in the interest of the two friendly peoples.

Afterward, the meetings of the 13th session of the Iraqi-Bulgarian Joint Committee for Scientific, Technical and Economic Cooperation began. The Iraqi side to the meetings was headed by 'Amir Mahdi Salih, minister of agriculture and agrarian reform, and the Bulgarian side by Khristo Iliev Khristov, minister of foreign trade.

The two sides discussed the trade plan between Iraq and Bulgaria for the year 1982 and the projects which have so far been implemented in the fields of agriculture, irrigation, scientific and technical cooperation. They also discussed the problems that faced the implementation process. The following six committees have stemmed from the meetings: committee for trade, finance, planning and industry; committee for constructions; committee for technical and scientific cooperation; committee for agriculture and irrigation; committee for transport and tourism and committee for secretaryship. The committees will draw up the joint plans for cooperation between Iraq and Bulgaria in 1982.

CSO: 4404/92

PAPER VIEWS AGREEMENTS WITH TURKEY

JN271513 (Clandestine) Voice of Iraqi Kurdistan in Arabic 1600 GMT 26 Oct 81

[Text] Dear listeners, the paper SAWT AL-AKRAD, organ of the Central Committee of the Democratic Kurdish Party in Syria, has published the following important article:

A disgraceful collusion has been perpetrated against the Kurdish Liberation Movement. Reports say that secret agreements have been reached between the dictatorial Iraqi and Turkish regimes allowing the forces of each regime to penetrate as far as 20 kilometers inside the territories of the other to pursue the militant Kurds. These agreements were reached following several visits to Turkey by the Iraqi regime's foreign minister, during which he held talks with the fascist generals and discussed joint cooperation between the regimes to face the burgeoning Kurdish Liberation Movement.

The Kurdish Nationalist Movement is accustomed to such steps and, therefore, is not surprised at these new agreements which are resurrecting the buried articles of the Baghdad Pact. The two regimes have frequently disagreed on numerous issues, yet they agree on one joint objective: to strike at the liberation movements in the region, particularly the Kurdish Nationalist Movement.

These regimes are linked together by several common factors, such as:

1. Their racist nature and their criminal and bloody history of maltreatment of the Kurdish people, who are being subjected to continued massacres and annihilation such as those of [words indistinct] and Qal'at Dizah, resulting in thousands of martyrs.
2. The escalating Kurdish Nationalist Movement in Iraq and Turkey at the side of the struggle of the progressive movements of the Iraqi and Turkish peoples, which is scaring the two racist regimes.
3. The fact that the regimes are under the umbrellas of U.S. imperialism, which is supporting them and cooperating with them in order to eliminate the various nationalist liberation movements which constitute an important tributary of the world revolution against imperialism, Zionism and reaction.

This brings to mind U.S. imperialism's role in the plotting against the Nationalist Kurdish Movement in Iraq during the signing of the treacherous 6 March agreement between the defunct shah and Saddam Husayn.

These joint plots against the Kurdish Nationalist Movement and the liberation movement of the region's peoples are natural results of the course taken by the dictatorial racist regimes backed and encouraged by U.S. imperialism.

In return, the various peoples of the region, including the Kurdish people, are requested to unite their struggle and strengthen their solidarity with the world powers of liberation, progress and socialism, particularly the Soviet Union, against the joint enemy, which is imperialism, Zionism and other racist reactionary regimes.

CSO: 4404/92

BRIEFS

LIBERATION FRONT RECEIVES SUPPORT MESSAGES--Arab student organizations in Yugoslavia and the Public Health Trade Union in Djibouti have hailed the emergence of the Arab Front for the Liberation of Ahvaz. In a message to the front, the Arab student organizations have declared their support for the front in its armed struggle against the racist Persians to liberate the usurped lands. The message stresses that the creation of the front is a decisive response to the Persian domination that stands against Saddam's soldiers, who are defending the eastern flank of the Arab homeland to establish legitimate Arab rights. In a similar message, the Public Health Trade Union in Djibouti has stressed that the charter of the Arab Front for the Liberation of Ahvaz will liberate the Arab people of Ahvaz from the persecution of the racist Persians. The trade union has wished the front success in its struggle. [Text] [GF261414 Baghdad Domestic Service in Arabic 1130 GMT 26 Oct 81]

ARABS ABLE TO FACE ISRAELIS--Amman--The Jordanian weekly newspaper AKHBAR AL-USBU' has affirmed that Iraq's war on the eastern flank of the Arab homeland has proved that the Arabs are capable of facing the Zionist enemy in a protracted war. In its latest edition, the paper said that Iraqi forces enjoy combat efficiency superior to that of the Iranian forces. It said that the Iraqi forces had seized two strategic positions in the Shush area during the past days, crushing the Iranian aggressors. The paper adds that the Iraqi Army enjoys military superiority and high spirits and is the master of initiatives in the war against Iran. [Text] [JN311800 Baghdad Voice of the Masses in Arabic 1600 GMT 31 Oct 81]

CSO: 4404/92

BRIEFS

REPEAL ON PRESS LAW DEFERRED--In its session yesterday, the National Assembly deferred a decision on the report of the Committee for Educational, Cultural and Guidance Affairs. The report calls for repealing Article 35-BIS of the Press and Publications Law. Twenty-nine deputies voted in support of the committee's report, while 24 abstained. It was decided to vote on the report in another session without further discussion. During yesterday's session, the government asked for a 2-week postponement of the issue so the article can be debated. Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad, deputy prime minister, foreign minister and acting information minister, said that Article 35-BIS was initiated so that the Kuwaiti press would not be exploited and that the article is not opposed to the freedom of speech. [Text] [GF300926 Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 28 Oct 81 p 1]

MILITARY APPOINTMENTS--An ordinance has been issued appointing Maj Gen ('Abd al-Latif Faysal al-Suwayni) adviser at the Amiri court. Another ordinance promotes Brig Gen (Yuzuf Badr al-Khrasi) to the rank of major general and appoints him under secretary at the Ministry of the Interior. [Text] [LD160500 Kuwait Domestic Service in Arabic 1000 GMT 15 Oct 81]

ENVOY TO SWEDEN--Ghazi al-Rayyis, Kuwaiti ambassador to Sweden, has presented his credentials to King Gustaf of Sweden. Al-Rayyis had held the position of Kuwaiti diplomatic chief of mission in Great Britain. [Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 27 Oct 81 p 3]

CSO: 4404/92

FORMER PRESIDENT ANSWERS REAGAN ON LEBANESE CRISIS

PM020907 Beirut AN-NAHAR in Arabic 27 Oct 81 p 2

[Unattributed report: "Criticizing Reagan's Statement, Sham'un Says: 'What Must Be Remedied Is Lebanese Crisis; Problem Lies in Presence of Foreign Occupation'"]

[Text] [Former] President Camille Sham'un yesterday drew the attention of U.S. President Ronald Reagan to the fact that "the crisis which must be remedied is the Lebanese crisis and not the crisis of the south." He emphasized that the problem lies in "the presence of foreign occupation." He urged the government to present at the forthcoming summit conference "clear-cut demands for the evacuation of the armed foreigners, be they Syrian forces or others."

Commenting on U.S. President Ronald Reagan's statement on the Middle East situation, Sham'un said: "It is my conviction that President Reagan's statement on the Middle East issue and the dangers surrounding the region is so exaggerated that I, who am aware of what is happening in the Middle East, do not share his view on the existence of this imminent danger. In any case, I hope that nothing will happen that will expose peace to danger. The danger could arise as a result of the existing dispute between Egypt and Sudan on the one side and Libya on the other.

"As for the section of the statement on this part of the Middle East--Lebanon--I fear that President Reagan's geographical knowledge may be restricted to South Lebanon and does not extend to all Lebanese territory. The crisis which must be tackled is the Lebanese crisis and not the crisis of South Lebanon, where a cease-fire prevails and which does not constitute any danger as long as the two sides maintain the cease-fire.

"Our problem is the Lebanese crisis and the presence of foreign occupation of Lebanese territories. It is this crisis which must be dealt with. Therefore, Mr Reagan must see things as we see them if he really wishes to remedy the Lebanese crisis.

"Meanwhile, as it is preparing for the Fez [Arab summit] conference, the Lebanese Government must not deal with the issue of the south as an alternative to dealing with the Lebanese crisis. The government must present a bold view and clear-cut demands for the evacuation of the armed foreigners, be they Syrian forces or others, from the Lebanese territories so that Lebanon will revert to being what it was and should be--a sovereign independent state on the same level as the rest of the Arab states which are to participate in the conference, especially since the president of the Lebanese Republic will be opening the conference. Lebanon's sovereignty must be complete."

CSO: 4404/97

LEBANON

MADY INTERVIEW ON LEBANESE, ARAB LOBBIES

NC301030 Beirut MONDAY MORNING in English 26 Oct-1 Nov 81 pp 18-22

[Article by Lydia Georgi]

[Text] Alfred Mady, the representative of the rightist "Lebanese forces" in North America, last week denied reports of cooperation between the Israeli and rightist Lebanese lobbies in Washington, describing them as "rumors put out by the Arab lobby there."

In an interview with MONDAY MORNING during a brief visit to Beirut, Mady said: "I think we're finished with this business (of alleged connections between Israel and the rightist Lebanese), even here in Lebanon. I don't think we have any direct contacts with the Zionist groups. These were rumors put out by the Arab lobby there (in Washington). The only way they could think of to fight the Lebanese lobby were these rumors, claiming that any victory we achieve in the U.S. was achieved by the Zionist movements. That is absolutely false. Every one of our successes was achieved by Lebanese and American-Lebanese efforts."

He added: "Because the Zionists fight the Syrians and we fight the Syrians, the two lobbies may sometimes appear to be taking similar positions, but that is mere coincidence."

Mady, who is also the executive director of the rightist Lebanese Information and Research Center in Washington (an office started and financed by the Lebanese forces), described his group's relations with other Arab and Arab-American organizations in the U.S. as "conflicting."

"The Arab-Lebanese conflicts that you see in Lebanon are reflected in the U.S.," he said. "We don't have any relations with the Arabs there, but we fight a lot indirectly--not because we don't like them, but because their position is hostile to the Lebanese cause. While we try to inform the people there about what is going on in Lebanon exactly, they do the opposite. While our main cause is the Lebanese cause, theirs is the Palestinian cause--or so they claim, at least, although they may not mean it. We start from different premises."

Where Lebanon was concerned, the Arab and Arab-American groups in the U.S. "are usually very late in adopting positions when major developments occur," Mady said.

"They wait and see how a certain position might affect their interests with this or that Arab country," he explained. "When Zahlah was shelled, for instance, and when the troubles broke out in Tripoli, they hesitated. They were afraid of what the Syrians would do. They usually avoid specific issues and concentrate on general principles, because...who are the Arabs, after all? Should the 'Arab lobby' work for the Saudis or the Libyans? For Egypt or Syria or Iraq? They have a problem when it comes to specific issues. We don't. We know our position and do not hesitate to make it known."

In fact, Mady said, there was no such thing as an Arab lobby in the U.S.

"Take the National Association of Arab-Americans (NAAA), which claims to be an Arab lobby. The trouble with these people is that they are not really interested in lobbying. Most of them are doing what they do because they have financial interests in the Arab world. This group is only trying to make money out of the Arabs, and I think the Arab embassies are becoming more and more aware of this."

Arab divisions and lack of commitment among the Arab-American groups in the U.S. are two of the reasons for the Arab lobby's failure in Washington, according to Mady.

The third reason, as he sees it, is that "90 percent of the two million Americans of Middle Eastern descent are Lebanese-Americans. The so-called NAAA claims to represent part of the Lebanese-American community, but the fact is that it does not, and it is because the majority of the Arab-American votes come from the Lebanese-Americans that we are successful and the NAAA is not.

"This fact was explained to an Arab leader, an Arab prince, on the hill (in Congress). He remarked that the Arabs were spending a great deal of money and getting nothing in return in terms of support for Arab issues. He was told: 'In the U.S., most of the voters of Middle Eastern origin are Lebanese, and since your position in Lebanon is against the Lebanese, those voters are not backing you. Unless you have the votes, no amount of money that you spend can produce anything.'"

The majority of the predominant Lebanese-American community in the United States was staying clear of all specific Arab issues, including the hot issue of the AWACS sale to Saudi Arabia, Mady told me.

"The Arabs," he said, "cannot expect help from the Lebanese abroad as long as they are helping kill the Lebanese in Lebanon. Unless they adopt clear positions in favor of Lebanon, they can expect nothing from the American Lebanese. We're willing to help the Arabs abroad if they're willing to help us in Lebanon, if they adopt clear positions on our problem in Lebanon. Until then, the Lebanese will continue to take no position on Arab issues."

Mady suggested that it might not be long before the Arab and rightist Lebanese lobbies in Washington began to cooperate.

"I think the NAAA and the Arab embassies are beginning to come around to our point of view," he said, "our point of view being that the Middle Eastern and Lebanese crisis can be separated a bit, in order to settle the Lebanese conflict first and

then see what we can do about the Middle Eastern conflict. They are all coming around to this position now, and I think we may in the future have a kind of relationship with them in which we agree on certain topics and issues."

Asked if his group and the Lebanese Embassy in Washington saw eye to eye on the major issues, Mady said there was no conflict between him and the embassy--simply because the embassy usually adopted no position at all.

"The problem is not in the embassy itself. Some of the people staffing it are capable of doing the right thing. The problem is with the Lebanese system as a whole. It's outdated. It's not aggressive. Lebanon's foreign policy is shy. The foreign minister (Fuad Butrus), for whom I have a lot of respect, is a very aggressive person, but below the level of the foreign minister himself, total shyness is the policy.

"Privately, we agree with the embassy on some things and disagree on others, but we never clash because the embassy never declares a position publicly."

In contrast, he said, the Lebanese forces have a clear "foreign policy," and that policy "is aimed basically at trying to get the foreign people out of our country so that we can have a good democracy with equal rights for everyone, to enable us to rebuild our country later.

"This is what we are trying to sell the people and government of the U.S."

The "selling" is being done by the Lebanese Information and Research Center in Washington--an office staffed by eight people--in cooperation with an unspecified number of Lebanese-American "social organizations" which were already in existence when the Lebanese forces opened their Washington office in July 1978.

"Shaykh Bashir (al-Jumayyil, commander of the Lebanese forces) and myself decided to start opening offices when we made our first trip to the U.S. toward the end of 1977," Mady said. "We made that decision because we had discovered the real potential of the Lebanese people, and because we had learned that if we wanted anything done to extricate our cause from the hands of the various powers in the region, we had to do it ourselves, since our government was not really capable of presenting our case as it should be presented."

The Lebanese Forces Office, which is registered with the U.S. Government as a foreign agent, has been cooperating with various Lebanese-American organizations, including the American-Lebanese League (ALL), to present the Lebanese case as it sees it to Congress, the State Department, the Pentagon, the White House, different lobbying groups, the churches, the unions, the universities and the media.

"One of our goals," Mady said, "is to educate the public, especially our own people in America--almost two million American Lebanese who must be given the right information about their country of origin."

Mady said that the Lebanese forces were now, "for the first time in history," making use of the tremendous potential of the Lebanese emigrants in the U.S.

"Lebanon has for 45 years been trying to abuse our emigrants," he said. "The Lebanese Government, the Lebanese leaders, the Lebanese people are all responsible for this. All they wanted from the emigrants was money. As for us, we don't want their money; we don't want them to come to Lebanon and build things here--not yet, anyway. What we want from them is their time. They can be a powerful worldwide lobbying group, and they can help save Lebanon."

As an example of Lebanon's past dealings with its emigrants, Mady drew attention to the World Lebanese Cultural Union (WLCU), an organization which claims to represent Lebanese emigrants around the world.

"This organization was first conceived by Pierre al-Jumayyil (leader of the rightist Phalangist Party)," Mady said. "After a while, he thought it would be a good idea to hand it over to the government, so he did. As a result, it is now a useless organization."

The WLCU, which is attached to the Lebanese Foreign Ministry, is still operating. It held its annual conference in Canada last week.

Mady conceded that the Lebanese-American community was not a monolith with identical views, capable of moving as one united force.

Inter-Lebanese differences in Lebanon, he said, were reflected in the Lebanese-American community to a certain extent, but those differences were much more muted in America--thanks in part to "the way we have handled these matters."

Bashir al-Jumayyil's visit to the U.S. earlier this year, Mady added, did more than gain the Lebanese forces additional understanding from the U.S. Government and media; it breathed new life into the Lebanese-American community, increasing its motivation to work for Lebanon.

The same was true of the subsequent visit to the U.S. by Maronite patriarch Antonius Butrus Khuraysh, "who put in a new spirit among all the Maronites there, especially those who were hesitant, who were not clear about the Lebanese cause. After the patriarch's visit, these are all coming back to work for the Lebanese cause."

To keep all levels of the American Government and people informed about Lebanon, Mady said, his office and the organizations that cooperate with it undertake the following activities:

--They publish LEBANON NEWS, a monthly four-page bulletin which may soon begin to be published on a fortnightly basis.

--They have started a news phone line, making it possible for anyone interested in the latest news from Lebanon to get it by dialing a number on the phone.

--They have started "operation roots," encouraging Lebanese-Americans and Americans interested in Lebanon to come to Lebanon for brief summer visits.

--They are issuing occasional background papers, usually every 2 or 3 months, each concentrating on a specific subject and distributed to "key people in the U.S."

--They undertake personal-contact campaigns.

The Lebanese forces, which also have offices in France, Italy, West Germany and Switzerland, were planning to step up their efforts in the Anglo-Saxon countries by opening an office in England and four new offices in the U.S. "over the next few years," Mady said.

He believes that the Reagan administration's attitude towards Lebanon is a great improvement over the attitude of the Carter administration--primarily because Reagan knows that Lebanon is important in three of his top-priority concerns.

"President Reagan's first concern is to stop Soviet penetration of the Middle East, and if Lebanon is lost to the Soviet Union or a Soviet proxy, a direct threat will be posed to the Gulf.

"His second concern is economic, and the free world has over the past 7 years discovered that Lebanon is the only country they can use as their base of operations in the Middle East, and that the Lebanese people's brains and talents are important to them in these operations.

"His third concern is to contain international terrorism, and we all know that international terrorists are being trained in Lebanon.

"So on all three counts, the U.S. has a strong motivation to settle the Lebanese problem."

This motivation, Mady said, was behind the dispatch of President Reagan's special envoy, Philip Habib, to the area and the American push for peace in Lebanon.

"We hope," he said, "that this political process will succeed in bringing peace to Lebanon and prompting the withdrawal of the Syrians from Lebanon so that we can have free presidential elections in 1982.

"So far, the process is continuing. Reagan has told his cabinet, and Haig has told his people, 'Go solve the Lebanese problem.' They are now trying all kinds of possible solutions.

"If this process does not succeed, I think the U.S. will have to think of a different position."

He added: "Don't forget that the Reagan administration does not really have a policy on this part of the world yet, beyond its policies on Egypt, Sudan and Libya. For the rest, American policy is being formulated on the ground. A final policy, a clear policy, will emerge between now and the new year."

CSO: 4400/45

MOVES ON INTERNAL SECURITY FRONT REPORTED

PM090929 Beirut AS-SAFIR in Arabic 3 Nov 81 p 4

[Unattributed report: "Deterrent Forces Begin Implementing Security Measures in Beirut and Suburb; Demonstrations Banned and Arms and Licenses Confiscated; Contacts for Completing Evacuation of Barracks; Sabbagh: 'This Accomplishment Is Expression of Unified Stand to Control Security and Resolve Living Problems'"]

[Excerpts] Early this morning the Arab Deterrent Forces began to implement the security measures announced by the Coordination Committee and the Higher Security Committee to control the security situation in Beirut and the southern suburb.

The deterrent forces set up several roadblocks in various areas in al-Mazra'ah, Tallat al-Khayyat and al-Awza'i, on the airport road and the UNESCO-Cola Road and in al-Rawshah and the southern suburb in addition to the fixed barriers in the various areas.

The deterrent forces also operated patrols in the internal areas and quarters. The patrols have seen to it that all armed manifestations are banned and that the heavy weapons are withdrawn from party barracks inside the capital. They also confiscated a large number of individual light arms, both licensed and unlicensed, from civilian cars, detained those who possessed these arms, took statements from them and rendered the licenses they carried null and void. They also arrested a number of these persons for investigation and closed some party centers.

At the Political Council

At 1000 some members of the secretariat of the Security Council of the National Movement--Dr Samir Sabbah, Hikmat al-'Id, Mahmud 'Abd al-Khaliq and Abu al-Izz--and two representatives of the popular and national forces in the secretariat--Ma'an Bashshur and Bashir al-Harbali--met with journalists at the Central Political Council headquarters.

During the meeting Sabbagh discussed the new measures. He said: The National Movement began to feel some time ago that the security situation in the national areas was deteriorating for political and personal reasons. As a result of the political developments, the deterrent forces abandoned their security role on the grounds that their presence and deployment were for military purposes and that they were supposed to have been quickly replaced by internal security forces to

carry out the required security task. However, some government machineries wanted security indiscipline to continue to prevail in the national areas so that this would have an adverse effect on the people's relationship with the National Movement.

He added: This security gap made us sense the negative effects it was having on our political plans to confront the schemes of the "Lebanese Front" and Israel. We therefore decided to take an interest in the situation and to adopt measures to activate the forces which are supposed to maintain security.

Security Tour

Afterward, the journalists accompanied the members of the Security Council Secretariat to the party barracks and the barriers of the deterrent forces which were implementing the decision to ban armed manifestations.

It was confirmed during the tour that the barracks of the National Syrian Social Party in al-Rawshah and the Socialist Progressive Party in al-Manarah Corniche were devoid of any armed manifestation and that only some men in civilian clothes remained there. They have also been stripped of fortification and sand barricades.

As for the "Arab Cavaliers Forces" camp, which belongs to the Arab Democratic Party in the area of the military beach, the men there were removing the sand barricades from the main entrance but vehicles and forces were still in the camp. The situation was the same in the barracks of the Arab socialist union--the Nasirite Organization--in 'Ayn al-Muraysah, which the members of the secretariat and journalists did not enter. The men who were guarding the barracks said that "it has been decided to do away with the current main center of the union and to turn the barracks into a main center and that the barracks has been cleared of arms.

It is worth mentioning in this respect that contacts are continuing to eliminate all the obstacles impeding the removal of armed manifestations from all the barracks.

In 'Ayn al-Muraysah as far as the Zuqaq al-Balat area (the patriarchate) it was observed that the position of the independent Nasirites Movement--al-Murabaitun--has been stripped of all armed manifestations and men and has been closed down completely. The same applied to the barracks of the "Movement of the Supporters of the Revolution" in al-Basta.

The Southern Suburb

In the southern suburb deterrent forces patrols and men manning the barriers were actively implementing the new measures. Armed manifestations have disappeared from the streets and from outside the party centers and the barracks of (Rawdat al-Shahidayn and al-Raduf) which belong to Amal Movement.

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TIES WITH GREECE STRONG, DESPITE SURFACE DIFFERENCES

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 82 5-11 Sep 81 pp 27-28

[Article by (Jirar Kasturyadis), AL-MAJALLAH's correspondent in Athens: "Strange Relations Between Libya and Greece"]

[Text] During the last few years Libya has developed close relations with Greece, its neighbor to the north. Libyan ties with Greece, which have become very strong and far-advanced, have caused observers in Athens to inquire as to the reason for Col Qadhdhafi's interest in this small county, whose population is no more than 10 million, and his support for the "Libyan lobby" in Athens, which is a very influential financial and political troupe of people who have far-ranging political ambitions. AL-MAJALLAH has chosen to open the dossier of Greek-Libyan relations, and it is a dossier which contains provocative and important information which occasionally goes beyond the scope of the two countries involved.

From the very first moment a person gets the impression that Greek-Libyan relations are somewhat strange. Usually relations between the two countries have been excellent, although they were not always as cordial. There have been many developments, both positive and negative, in relations between the two countries, but they have never reached the stage requiring severing the last remaining basic link which has always kept the two countries together. In other words, they have been the type of relations that one could expect between members of a family rather than relations between two countries which are governed by completely different types of political systems. Libya's system is that of the "Libyan Jamahiriya," whereas Konstandinos Karamanlis's Greek republic is a member both of NATO and of the EEC. Nevertheless, if we look closely at these two countries we will see that Greek-Libyan relations possess a logic of their own and are based on the two countries' need for each other for various reasons.

As proof of this one can cite a typical incident, which occurred not long ago and which can shed some light on the situation which exists between the two countries. Last 22 February a Libyan pilot defected with his Mig-23 airplane and flew to Greece. He landed on the island of Crete, which is directly across from the Libyan city of Benghazi on the shore of the Mediterranean, and he asked for political asylum.

This incident constituted an embarrassment for the Greek authorities, particularly because many Libyan air force pilots were in Greece and were being trained to fly Mirage planes (which both the Greek and Libyan air forces have). Furthermore, many Libyan naval cadets were studying in the Greek Naval Academy, and hundreds of [Libyan] students were receiving their education in Greek universities.

Libya immediately demanded the return of the plane along with its pilot. At the same time, the NATO countries insisted on being allowed to examine the Mig plane since it was believed that this plane was a brand-new Soviet model.

Greece came to be in a very embarrassing position, because it was torn between its allegiance to NATO and its close friendship with Libya. At first Greece tried to avoid revealing the identity of the airplane. However, as soon as the news became known, Libya was permitted to recover the plane but the pilot was handed over to a representative of the UN's high commissioner for refugee affairs in Athens. The Greek authorities refused to return the pilot to Libya because it was certain that he would be executed there. Finally he was sent to the U.S. after being given political asylum. The Libyans got angry and immediately stopped their shipments of oil to Greece. A few days thereafter a Libyan destroyer blocked the path of a Greek fishing vessel and brought it to the port of Benghazi. This chain of events, according to all normal international standards, would certainly serve to endanger relations between the two countries. However, this did not happen. The Libyan officers peacefully continued to receive their training in Greece.

Furthermore, one week later oil began to be shipped to Greece again, and the Greek fishing vessel was released after Mr Ahmad Shahati, who is in charge of foreign affairs in the Libyan government and thus in charge of the "people's bureaus" (Libyan embassies) abroad, visited Athens where he stated in a press conference that bilateral relations between the two countries were "excellent."

Mr. Shahati then became a regular visitor to Athens and was the chief guest at the conference in Athens which was held by the Council for International Solidarity with the Arab Nations. The main topic dealt with by the council was the Palestine question.

The "Libyan Lobby"

The Libyan pilot's escape to Greece, and other similar previous incidents when armed Libyan vessels seized Greek vessels, and later on released them, conclusively demonstrate the close special relationship which exists between Athens and Tripoli. They also provide proof of the degree of influence which the "Libyan lobby" has in Greece.

Greek-Libyan ties are far older than the 1 September Revolution which was mounted by Col Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi. In fact they are rooted deep in history. Nevertheless, these relations soon became a great deal stronger and firmer due to the Vardinogiannis brothers. They are members of one of the large land-owning families on the island of Crete--families which also own an oil refinery (which refines Libyan crude oil), a shipping company, and many other companies.

The "Libyan lobby" in Greece, therefore, is represented by a Mr Pavlos Vardinogiannis. He is one of three brothers, is a member of the Greek parliament, and is a personal friend of Col Qadhdhafi. He was also chosen as president of the Arab-Greek Friendship Association (which does not enjoy the esteem of all of the Arab groups in Athens). Furthermore, he is known for his great ambition to become a minister in the next Greek government.

At the same time, Pavlos Vardinogiannis is a close friend of the Greek foreign minister, Kostandinos Mitsotakis, who represents Crete in the present government. Together the two men formed the Independent Greek Party, which is one of the groups

belonging to the country's ruling New Democracy majority. Having such friends, Libya was able to establish firm relations with Greece. Greece has benefited from this relationship since it imports from Libya about 10 percent of its annual petroleum needs--about 2 million tons. Most of these Libyan crude oil shipments are transported via Greek transport vessels. Furthermore, Greek companies, especially construction and development companies, have been awarded hundreds of millions of dollars worth of contracts [by Libya], including contracts involving military installations.

Strategic Reasons for the Open-Door Policy

It is believed that there are strategic reasons for Libya conducting an open-door policy with regard to Greece and the other countries of the Mediterranean. The best friends which Libya has in Greece are from the island of Crete where Libya has been engaging in investments on a broad scale. Thus by means of establishing firm relations with Greece and Crete, which is the location of the largest American base in the Mediterranean, Libya is endeavoring to obtain a "guarantee" that this base will not be used against it. This is particularly important for Libya because it is very afraid that it will be attacked by the U.S. In particular Col Qadhafi appears to be convinced that someday Egypt and the U.S. will mount a joint attack on his country. The Libyan-U.S. aerial confrontation over the Gulf of Sidra, and developments which accompanied it, have shown that there is justification for the Libyan leader's fears. This aerial confrontation having taken place, it seems clear that Greek-Libyan relations will acquire even greater importance.

Greece--a country which closely follows events in the Middle East--for its part, has made it clear to the Libyan authorities that it will not allow its territory to be used as a base for attack against Libya or against any part of the Middle East, nor will it allow the U.S. Rapid Deployment Forces to be stationed there. In the long run Libya also has the objective of "freeing the Mediterranean basin of all imperialist bases" (NATO bases). This is a policy which Libya forcefully and actively pursued with Malta until Malta closed down its British naval base there. In addition to this, Libya is continuing to give successful support to forces in Greece which are opposed to the NATO alliance. This policy is also supported by the Soviet Union which maintains close relations with Libya. The third well-founded reason for Tripoli consolidating its ties with Greece is the fact that Libya is geographically isolated. With the exception of Chad, Libya regards all of its neighbors suspiciously. In addition to this, Libya would like to keep at least one extra window open through which it could look out on the Mediterranean basin.

Libyan Radio Station

Libya is also endeavoring to set up, either on the island of Crete or in the Greek part of Cyprus, a radio station which beams its broadcasts to the Middle East. This would replace the station which they used to have which was shut down by Malta after Malta's conflict with Libya concerning oil-drilling rights. But so far Libya has not gotten permission to set up such a radio station. Libya's activities in Greece have caused resentment on the part of some of the other Arab countries, particularly Iraq. Reports have mentioned that Libya, at one stage, asked Greece to supply Iran with American military equipment and spare parts when the Gulf war began, but that Greece rejected this request.

Iraq, in turn, has mounted diplomatic efforts to consolidate its relations with Cyprus and with Greece. It has increased the number of its diplomatic personnel in both of these countries, has organized a number of exhibits [there], and has asked the Greeks to participate in its development plans in order to entice them away from Qadhdhafi--their "sole friend." Although the pro-Libyans in Greece either have sensitive positions in the government or occupy positions which are close to the government and to influential circles, the Iraqis right now are almost openly actively supporting the opposition Greek Socialist Party which is led by Dr Andreas Papandreou. He is the probable winner in the coming elections which will be held in Greece next November.

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SIGNIFICANCE OF SIDRA INCIDENT EXPLORED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 236, 29 Aug 81 pp 30-31

[Article by Riyadh Najib al-Rayyis: "An Attempt to Resist Drawing Historical Parallels"]

[Text] Who among us talks about Sarajevo? Who among us has ever visited Bosnia? Is there anyone who talks about the Austrian archduke who was assassinated by that militant anarchist who lit the fire which began World War I? Perhaps nobody ever mentions this.

But there might be those among us who talk about the Suez War and Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir, and who talk about the swell of Arab vigor which transformed defeat into victory. A quarter of a century has gone by since the Suez War took place, but memories of it are still fresh in our minds.

In 1914 Sarajevo was one of the provinces of Bosnia which was part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The capital of this empire was Vienna, and at that time it included Hungary, the capital of which is Budapest. This empire was the home of the Blue Danube, the music of Strauss, and dreamlike waltz melodies.

In 1956 Suez was a province in Egypt. It was the name of a small village on the bank of the canal which was the lifeline for Europe and for its remaining colonies throughout Africa and Asia. Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir was the beginning of the Arabs' dreams of liberation from imperialism and of achieving some degree of unity and dignity. At that time the music of the tune "By God, destiny is my weapon" filled the ears of the Arabs with delight.

In 1914 the velvety world of Europe collapsed due to the one bullet which was shot in Sarajevo, and the doors were opened to the holocaust of World War I which nobody now either remembers or wants to talk about.

In 1956 the colonial world of Europe collapsed and this ended up, for the Arabs, the doors to the tide of liberation and independence which the Western countries today would like to close once again. One must resist drawing historical parallels in order that the Libyan-American confrontation over the Gulf of Sidra last week not confuse us concerning what is possible and what is impossible. It is possible that the Gulf of Sidra incident could be another Suez War, but it is impossible that this incident could be another Sarajevo.

Until 1914 very few people had ever heard of Bosnia, Sarajevo, or even the archduke of Austria. In 1981 few people in the world had heard of the Gulf of Sidra in Libya or had heard of the colonel [as published], although they had heard of Col Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi, one of the world's big mouths and the object of concern on the part of world leaders, and they had also heard of President Ronald Reagan, who in the past was a movie actor in Grade B films and who is presently the President of the U.S. Since it is necessary for us to resist the temptation to draw historical parallels, we should not attach a great deal of importance to what Col Qadhdhafi said after the two Libyan planes were shot down last week, which was: "I will defend the Gulf of Sidra even if this leads to a third world war."

It is true that the colonel did say this, but it is not true that the colonel wants a third world war. Nobody wants a third world war.

Therefore, the American and Western onslaught must be controlled so that it does not bring back the scenario of the beginning of World War I and the Suez War.

The aroma of "another Suez War" has already begun to reach the noses of both European and American circles.

During the first few days of the Suez War, Britain, France, and along with them all of the other colonial powers, proclaimed that the war was being waged in order to guarantee the security of a waterway which, if closed, would threaten the whole industrial world with danger. But what these countries wanted was the head of the man who ruled the banks of the Suez Canal. Imperialist Europe told the world that Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir wanted to build an expansionist empire at the expense of Europe's interests and for the benefit of the USSR and the communist world.

Today Washington is striking up the same tune. The U.S. is saying that the Gulf of Sidra is an international body of water and that the man who rules over this gulf wants to build an expansionist Soviet empire which threatens U.S. interests. The fact is that the U.S. only wants to have his head when it describes him as being "the most dangerous man in the world."

'Abd al-Nasir was not Hitler, as Anthony Eden, the British prime minister, described him at that time, nor is Qadhdhafi the 'Abd al-Nasir of today. 'Adb al-Nasir ruled a nation of 40 million people in a land possessing infinite significance in terms of civilization, history, and the Arab world. He appeared under historical circumstances characterized by given factors which are lacking today. Qadhdhafi, though, rules a vast and rich country, with a population of no more than 3 million, under historical circumstances which are different from the circumstances of 'Abd al-Nasir in his time. However, the accusation being made is the same one, and it is feared that the result will turn out to be the same.

Perhaps Col Qadhdhafi's basic trait is that he dares to say things which any other leader today would be afraid to say openly. In his frankness there is a great deal of spontaneity and Bedouin temperament which Reagan and his administration in Washington do not find their liking.

But to what degree is it possible to resist drawing historical parallels? Only to a certain degree. Otherwise, why is the U.S. engaging in all of this talk about laws of the seas and territorial water boundaries in order to provide a smoke screen for its obvious action of military provocation against a nation which is small,

no matter how much it tries to expand beyond its borders by means its ideas, money, and weapons? Why was the U.S. engaging in military maneuvers in disputed waters if it wanted to avoid a clash with Libya rather than attempt to bring about this clash? It is true that the author of the Green Book has few friends either in the Arab world or in the rest of the world. It is also true that his greatest "crime" in the eyes of the West is that he has given aid to all of the lost causes in the world--from the IRA to Idi Amin. But it should be said in the colonel's behalf that the "lost" causes, which he has supported, have always been the causes of helpless nations rebelling against their colonial masters and striving toward the attainment of a better life. Perhaps such nations have not achieved any of this, but the colonel has helped them achieve some of the standing of glory which fate has not generously bestowed upon them.

It is also true that the U.S., by means of its military confrontation with Libya, is utilizing all of the risks involved in this confrontation to flex its muscles in its confrontation with the Soviet Union. This is because another of the colonel's "crimes" has been that he has bought an arsenal of advanced Soviet weapons in order to provide his country with the strength and long arm needed for him to protect his interests. As far as the U.S. is concerned, this is something which is forbidden. It was forbidden in the days of 'Abd al-Nasir, and it is forbidden in the days of Qadhafi. What has Qadhafi lost as a result of his two planes being shot down? Nothing. [What has he gained?] Perhaps the support of all Arabs--including all those who love him and all those who hate him. He has mobilized all of the Arab hatred for the U.S. and the Western world. For the time being he has shown the invalidity of any justification which says that the danger of the Soviet Union is the danger which threatens the Arabs and Muslims from all sides. He has shown that the real danger is the danger coming from the U.S. and Israel, and that it is the U.S. which is always on the attack. People have already forgotten the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and events in Poland, and they no longer remember Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

What has Reagan gained? Nothing. He has gained nothing as far as the Arabs, Europeans, or even Western nations are concerned. Whoever did not like Qadhafi before now has started to like him, and whoever hesitated to accept Reagan's leadership of the Western camp is now more sceptical than ever. What has he gained? Has he shown that the U.S. is capable of backing up its words with its muscles? What does this mean?

It means that we have a confrontation of giants with small nations--a confrontation which could lead to what happened after Sarajevo. Let us deal somewhat with this historical parallel in an attempt on our part to put the latest actions on the part of the Libyans in a proper perspective.

During the aerial clash between the U.S. and Libya, Col Qadhafi was in Aden where he was signing a treaty of friendship and cooperation with both Ethiopia and South Yemen. The common denominator among Aden, Tripoli, and Addis Ababa is that their regimes maintain close relations with the Soviet Union and that the three countries sense that they are somewhat isolated in the midst of the open territories and bodies of water which surround them. South Yemen's relations with the nations of the Arabian Peninsula are relations which are at best cautious, if not hostile. Ethiopia's relations with the nations in the Horn of Africa are relations which are characterized by tension and military confrontations. Libya's relations with the nations of North Africa are cool relations, if not mostly bad relations. The relations

of all three nations with the Arab world, Africa, and Asia are relations which are, for the most part, unhealthy. But the thing which links these nations to each other is the fact that they all have direct ties with Moscow. Furthermore, they control three sensitive strategic locations which are of utmost importance as far as the policy of the Soviet Union is concerned. Also, the three nations constitute a real line of confrontation for the policy of the U.S. and the Western nations as far as fundamental geographical conflicts are concerned. Reagan, with his policy of flexing his military muscles, has managed to achieve things for Libya which Libya might have found difficult to achieve otherwise. As a result, Libya has obtained complete Arab support for its policy of confrontation with the U.S., and has managed to convince all sceptics that the U.S. only wants to keep the Arabs in an inferior position and wants to open up, for its allies in South Yemen and Ethiopia, Arab doors that had been previously slammed in their faces.

Therefore the most important condemnation issued concerning the action of shooting down the two Libyan planes was the statement made by the secretary-general of the Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC], 'Abdallah Bisharah. He said: "We consider the action engaged in by the U.S. to be a political attack which is strongly condemned by the GCC. It was a provocative trap set up by the U.S. for Libya to fall into, and it was an action like those of the pirates of the Middle Ages on the high seas." The GCC embraces the six nations of the Gulf, including Saudi Arabia and the Sultanate of Oman, both of which maintain no diplomatic or friendly relations with Libya.

Qadhdhafi also succeeded in persuading Shaykh Zayid ibn Sultan Al Nuhayyan, president of the UAE, during his visit with him last week, to have the UAE represent Libya's interests in the U.S. This represents the strongest endorsement so far, by a Gulf nation, of Libya's position.

Qadhdhafi also discussed two other important points with Shaykh Zayid:

1. The resumption of UAE economic and financial aid, and increasing such aid, to South Yemen.
2. The urgent necessity [for the UAE] to quickly establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union if the UAE wants to keep the GCC from having to pursue a policy of complete allegiance to, and alignment with, one particular bloc of nations.

During his short visit to Kuwait, Col Qadhdhafi also brought up the subject of Kuwaiti economic and financial aid to Aden and the political positions taken by the GCC.

The reason for the Libyan leader bringing up the subject of economic aid to South Yemen--in view of the fact that Kuwait and the UAE are the only two nations which provide aid to South Yemen--was his fear that the future policy of the GCC would be to halt this aid and that both the UAE and Kuwait would consequently be forced to go along with this policy.

Qadhdhafi also had another reason for bringing up the subject of establishing diplomatic relations with Moscow. The reason was that he knew Shaykh Zayid's opinion concerning this subject, which he had previously stated in an interview with AL-MUSTAQBAL, and he knew the opinion of Kuwait, which has already had relations with Moscow for 10 years and which supported his initiative. He was also afraid that

the other four nations in the GCC would prevent the possibility of establishing these relations with Moscow unless the establishment of such relations was accomplished quickly enough so that later on it would be difficult to undo such an action. So that we should not once again be inclined to draw historical parallels, [we should know that] Reagan has already succeeded in achieving for Qadhdhafi, in Libya's Gulf of Sidra, what Anthony Eden succeeded in achieving for 'Abd al-Nasir at Egypt's Suez Canal. The crisis is still in its initial stage, and although people might have forgotten Sarajevo they still talk about the woes of World War I. And although they might have forgotten Anthony Eden, they still talk about Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir and the glories of the Suez War--with all of their assets and liabilities. These people are often seeing this historical parallel in their dreams, and they are afraid of it!

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CSO: 4504/8

BRIEFS

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH PHILIPPINES--Doha, 10 Nov (GNA)--A statement issued here today says that the state of Qatar and the Philippines have decided to establish diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level. The statement, which was issued by the Qatari Foreign Ministry, says that the establishment of such relations comes within the framework of bolstering relations between the two countries in all fields. [Text] [GF101250 Manama Gulf News Agency in Arabic 1130 GMT 10 Nov 81]

AMBASSADOR TO DENMARK--Sharidah Jibran al-Ka'bi, Qatar's ambassador to Great Britain, submitted his credentials today to the Danish queen as Qatar's nonresident ambassador to Denmark. Al-Ka'bi submitted his credentials as Qatar's nonresident ambassador to Norway on 29 September 1981. [Manama Gulf News Agency in Arabic 0540 GMT 14 Oct 81]

CSO: 4404/92

DAILY ON CONDITIONS FOR ACCEPTING PEACE

JN060634 Damascus Domestic Service in Arabic 0430 GMT 6 Nov 81

[Report from the press review]

[Text] In a commentary entitled "Those Searching for Peace," Tishrin says: Any peace plan in the region that does not achieve justice cannot achieve peace, only ignominious capitulation. Any peace that does not place the Palestinian people's rights at the top of priorities and does not reflect our Palestinian Arab people's desire to return to their land and establish an independent state on their national soil is no more than a big plot against this people and all our Arab people.

Syria's enemies have carried out a large-scale campaign against it, accusing it of being opposed to world peace and peace in the region in particular. If those enemies portray capitulation as peace, Syria is proud to oppose such a peace and will work to prevent its establishment with all available means.

However, the enemies of Syria and the Arab nation know full well that Syria is seeking to establish a real and just peace, one which differs essentially and completely from the alleged peace they are talking about and want to implement in the region by force and coercion.

Tishrin adds: We in Syria, as President Hafiz al-Asad stated, are advocates of peace and will remain so. Indeed, we shall defend peace. However, we reject capitulation because our dignity, honor and pan-Arab identity reject such capitulation. Thus, any plan that does not safeguard dignity, honor and identity will be rejected by Syria and the Arab people represented by Syria. As is known, Syria will remain the steadfast rock on which all liquidatory solutions will flounder. At the same time, it will continue to work to establish peace and to exert efforts to strengthen itself since no peace can be achieved without Arab strength.

CSO: 4404/97

REFORM OF BANKING SYSTEM ENVISAGED

London 8 DAYS in English No 43, 31 Oct 81 pp 46-47

[Text] TUNISIA'S next Five Year Development Plan (1982-1986) is expected to liberalise the country's rigid financial legislation significantly. These reforms could, in turn, encourage the expansion of the Tunisian banking system and revitalise the stock market.

At present, the Banque Centrale de Tunisie (BCT) imposes a strict control over the ten deposit and two investment banks, two development finance companies and the national savings fund. This excessive centralisation has the negative effect of limiting the initiative of bank managers, who often have a better working knowledge of local conditions and needs than bureaucrats in the BCT's office in Tunis.

Tunisian businessmen frequently complain of the delays and red tape involved in procuring credit facilities from banks. Over-centralisation has even worse effects in rural areas, where the 45 mutual credit banks are severely handicapped by existing laws. A freer hand to provide loans to farmers would boost agricultural productivity, as it would facilitate the introduction of modern machinery.

All medium- and short-term credit over Tunisian dinars 50,000 (\$100,000) must first be approved by the central bank. Tunisian banking sources told *8 Days* that they expected local banks to be granted greater leeway for their operations, with less interference by the BCT, in the near future.

A serious obstacle to successful business dealings is the fact that local banks are not allowed directly to carry out foreign currency dealings. The BCT also imposes restrictions on the choice of overseas correspondents. What is more, Tunisian banks tend to be undercapitalised.

The offshore banking sector, established in 1976, has been in the doldrums. Only four banks — Citibank, Bank of America, the Abu Dhabi National Bank and the Paris-based Union Tunisienne des Banques (UTB) — opened up Offshore Banking Units (OBUs), and the high hopes placed on this sector have largely come to nothing. For instance, Citibank has downgraded its unit to a representative office. One problem for the OBUs is the tight margins available to Tunisia on the eurodollar market — now only $\frac{3}{8}$ per cent above Libor.

Zaine Bach-Hamba of UTB told *8 Days*: 'The OBUs must envisage their presence in Tunisia in the long term. It is certain that if they came believing it would be easy to spin quick and large profits, they are bound to be disappointed.' Asked why a Tunisian bank had opened up an OBU in the country, Bach-Hamba commented: 'We see our role as helping to structure the market. Of course, we aren't in the market to make a killing, and we are satisfied with dealings which the other OBUs might consider too modest to handle.'

Reform of the banking system will, it is hoped, encourage Arab states to set up joint investment banks with Tunisia. So far such ventures have been launched with France and Qatar, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and, most recently, Algeria. These banks will play a pivotal role in financing large investment schemes during the 1982-1986 plan.

A stock exchange was created in February 1969 to organise and manage a stock market, but activity has been severely restricted, with a limited number of shares — 21m — available for trading. It is estimated, moreover, that only 500,000 shares are actually subject to transactions, as the state controls, either directly or indirectly, about 80 per cent of all shares, and institutional investors some 15 per cent. These

two rarely deal through public operations in the stock market, preferring more discreet agreements.

With such a limited stock portfolio available, it is no wonder that Tunisian and foreign investors are unenthusiastic about playing the Tunis stock market. The value of transactions in 1980 was only TD20.8m (\$41m). In fact, two-thirds of Tunisian enterprises have fewer than 20 stockholders; and only one Tunisian in 400 owns stock.

8 Days has learnt that a confidential study to reform the stock market has been carried out. One of the suggestions is that the state divest itself of shares worth about TD50m (\$100m). While creating a wider stock trading base, this measure would not entail a return of certain companies to the private sector, as the state would retain majority control.

The proceeds from the sale of this stock would enable the state either to diversify its holdings into other corporations or launch new ones. Another recommendation involves the establishment of a special agency, along the lines of the Moroccan government's *Société Nationale d'Investissement au Maroc*, to manage the state's

equity holdings.

To entice domestic investors as well as foreign ones, it will be necessary to improve the working of the stock market. In particular, a more attractive dividend policy and more extensive and regular financial data are necessary. Moreover, shares will have to be denominated in smaller units, if the more modest Tunisian investor is to be attracted to the stock market.

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